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When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far:
Public Health and Safety Should
Trump Corporate Profits
Julie E. Zink*
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the historical and ongoing use of trade
secrets to withhold critical information from the public. Through its
text and footnotes, the Article discusses the positives and negatives of
trade secret protection; addresses historical and current examples of
trade secret abuse; analyzes the inadequate solutions that have been
tried and proposed; and, ultimately, recommends changing trade secret
law by incorporating the precautionary principle into the definition of
a trade secret to ensure that protection will no longer be available for
information that endangers public health.
This Article is both timely and necessary, as the public is
continually bombarded with new products about which critical
information is withheld. In fact, an average of twenty new chemicals
enter the marketplace each week. As a result, unknowing humans are
acting as test subjects while companies, secreting away important
information about the products’ impact on public health, rake in record
profits. Drawing lessons from decades of past injuries, it is past time
for the United States to borrow from our European neighbors and
incorporate the precautionary principle into US trade secret law.
Doing so will allow for protection of trade secrets while also
maintaining public health. This Article provides a useful proposal for
academics, legislators, courts, and practitioners to consider as they
contend with the increased use of trade secrets and the numerous
health hazards caused by trade secret products and processes.
*
Professor of Lawyering Skills, University of Dayton School of Law (UDSL). As part
of UDSL’s Program in Law & Technology, the Author has taught Intellectual Property Law,
Trade Secret Law, and Patent Litigation. The Author also teaches courses on legal research and
writing. The Author wishes to thank Marci Hunnicut and David Bailey for their research
assistance, and her former and current colleagues Katherine Early and Dalindyebo Shabalala for
their valuable comments. The Author also wishes to thank the faculty members who provided
feedback during her presentation of this article topic at UDSL’s Faculty Colloquium Series.

1135

1136

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:4:1135

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1136	
  
THE BENEFITS OF PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS..................... 1137	
  
THE NEGATIVES OF SECRECY ................................................... 1142	
  
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE ................ 1144	
  
A. Perfluorooctanoic Acid ......................................................... 1145	
  
B. Vinyl Chloride ...................................................................... 1150	
  
C. Benzene ................................................................................. 1153	
  
V.
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE .................... 1156	
  
A. Hydraulic Fracturing .......................................................... 1158	
  
B. Genetically Modified Organisms......................................... 1162	
  
VI. CURRENT METHODS ARE INSUFFICIENT .................................. 1166	
  
VII. OTHERS’ SUGGESTIONS ............................................................. 1171	
  
VIII.	
   AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL: INCORPORATE THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE INTO TRADE SECRET LAW ....................................... 1175	
  
IX.	
   	
   CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 1180	
  
I.
II.
III.
IV.

I. INTRODUCTION
While there are positives to trade secret protection, such
protection should not be available when a trade secret causes harm to
public health and safety. Given the historical abuses committed by
corporations in the name of trade secrecy and the lack of measures to
effectively curtail such abuses, it is time to revise trade secret law to
ensure history does not continue to repeat itself. Companies should no
longer be permitted to hide behind the shield of trade secrets and
withhold information that negatively impacts public health and
safety.
To accomplish this goal, US trade secret law should
incorporate the European precautionary principle; doing so will shift
the burden to the trade secret owner to prove that its asserted trade
secret does not endanger public health. Once that burden is met,
trade secret protection will be available. If, however, the burden
cannot be met, then the asserted secret should be revealed as a matter
of public health and safety.
Part II of this Article discusses the positive societal effects
associated with the protection of trade secrets. Conversely, Part III
points out that secrecy also has some innate dangers. Next, Part IV
addresses historical examples of such abuses, while Part V discusses
some current examples. Part VI then explains that, unfortunately,
neither the legislative nor the judicial branches have been able to
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solve this dilemma of trade secret abuses. Several possible solutions
or partial solutions have been offered, and those suggestions are
covered in Part VII. However, none of the solutions adequately
balance the interests of the trade secret owners with those of the
public. Therefore, Part VIII lays out a proposal to revise the law by
incorporating the precautionary principle into the definition of a trade
secret.
II. THE BENEFITS OF PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS
In Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, US
philosopher and ethicist Sissela Bok acknowledges that not all secrecy
is intended to deceive or cause harm.1 Rather, some “secrecy is
invoked to protect what one owns.”2 For instance, protecting the
knowledge one has gathered or developed is often essential to
launching or maintaining a successful business.3 This is true whether
the information is technical in nature or business related.4 If the
process for creating a particular product is unknown by all but one
company, then having such information gives that company an
advantage over competitors.5 Likewise, if a company devotes its time,
energy, and money to collecting information on its customers (e.g.,
preferred product specifications, pricing data, or points of contact),
that company would not want to make such information available to
its competitors.6 In this regard, “American businesses own an
estimated $5 trillion dollars of trade secrets.”7
1.
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 7
(Vintage Books 1989) (1983). Sissela Bok, the daughter of two Nobel Prize winners, received her
Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard in 1970. See id. at 334; see also Judy Klemesrud, Sissela Bok:
A View of Life and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1983, at 66, www.nytimes.com/1983/03/06/style/
style-sissela-bok-a-view-of-life-and-ethics.html
[https://perma.cc/5DKJ-74N7].
Formerly
a
Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University, she is currently a Senior Visiting Fellow at the
Harvard School of Public Health. Faculty Members, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population-development/about-us/people/faculty/#B
[https://perma.cc/4UV8-YD8S] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
2.
BOK, supra note 1, at 24.
3.
See id. at 139 (“Incentives are strong to be the sole beneficiary of a process unknown
to competitors . . . .”).
4.
See id.; see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2017) (“The
definition of trade secret is thus unlimited as to any particular class or kind of matter . . . .”).
5.
See MILGRIM, supra note 4.
6.
See id.
7.
Hakeem Jeffries et al., Why Protecting Our Trade Secrets Is Essential to Saving the
Economy, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/protectingour-trade-secrets-is-essential-for-the-economy-2014-8?pt=385758&ct=Sailthru_BI_Newsletters&
mt=8&utm_source=Triggermail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=email_article
[https://perma.cc/L6ZZ-CZEQ].
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While some companies protect their technical information by
obtaining patent protection on their inventions, others choose not to
do so.8 First, many inventions may not be patentable, and if success is
not likely, then companies make the decision to not disclose the
information or spend the hefty fees associated with drafting and filing
a patent application.9 Second, it is much cheaper to maintain a trade
secret than to file for a patent, and patent infringement suits are less
likely for plaintiffs to win.10
Trade secrecy provides a measure of security to the owners of
such information, and compared to many other types of legal
protection, it is generally not difficult or expensive to meet the
required elements under the law.11 Information will be protected as a
trade secret if a person or entity (1) has specific information that (2)
has independent economic value (actual or potential), (3) which is not
generally known or readily ascertainable, and (4) has been protected
by reasonable secrecy measures.12 All of these elements must be
proven in order to obtain trade secret protection.13

8.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1974).
9.
See, e.g., id. at 487; BOK, supra note 1, at 140.
10.
BOK, supra note 1, at 140 (“About half of all lawsuits brought to defend trade secrets
are decided in favor of the plaintiffs, but less than 30 percent of patent-infringement suits are
decided in favor of the patent owners. As a result, companies are resorting more often to trade
secrecy, even when patenting is a possibility.”); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482–83.
11.
See R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets v. Patents: The New Calculus, LANDSLIDE,
July–Aug. 2010, at 1, 1–2 (“[P]atents are harder to get and harder to defend.”); Derek Handova,
The Business of IP: Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets, IPWATCHDOG (May 25, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/25/choosing-patents-and-trade-secrets/id=69368/
[https://perma.cc/Y4RJ-TDQM] (“Patents cost tens of thousands of dollars while trade secret
protection is essentially free . . . . [W]ith trade secrets there is no need to comply with formalities
or any formal process. And as a result, they can take immediate effect, with no significant
procedures or costs associated with their creation . . . .”).
12.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 defines the
term “trade secret” as encompassing
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing
if—(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information.
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.); see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). A similar definition is found in the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, which has been adopted by forty-seven states. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); Acts: Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMMISSION,

2018]

WHEN TRADE SECRECY GOES TOO FAR

1139

In terms of the “information” component, all forms and types of
information are potentially protectable, whether tangible or
intangible.14 The only limitation is that the claimed information must
not be a vague or abstract concept.15 The owner must be able to
articulate with specificity what it is claiming to be a trade secret.16
As to the “independent value” component, the trade secret
owner must show that the information has “actual or potential”
value.17 While use of the trade secret was originally required in order
to obtain protection, that ceased with the adoption of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA’s) definition of a trade secret, which
discarded the Restatement of Torts’ use requirement.18
Thus,
information has “potential” value even if there is no product or process
utilizing the information.19
Courts determine whether value is
present by examining the competitive advantage the information
provides to the owner or the advantage it would provide to the owner’s
competitors, as well as the amount of effort or money expended by the
owner in developing the information.20
The “not generally known or readily ascertainable” component
essentially requires that the information be secret.21 To determine
whether this element is met, courts consider the extent to which the
information is known outside of the owner’s business and the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.22
Finally, the “reasonable secrecy measures” component requires
that the owner take affirmative steps to protect the information.23
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%20Act
[https://perma.cc/MPD5THPY] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
13.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
14.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
15.
See SL Montevideo Tech., Inc. v. Eaton Aero, LLC, 491 F.3d 350, 351–52 (8th Cir.
2007); Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 264 (5th Cir. 2007); Big Vision Private
Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 224, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a
vague and indefinite piece of information cannot be protected).
16.
See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
17.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
18.
See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01 (“The UTSA substantive aspect closely parallels
the 1939 Restatement definition except that the UTSA has no requirement that, to be protected,
information must be used in one’s trade or business.”).
19.
See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
20.
See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722,
726–28 (7th Cir. 2003).
21.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i); see MILGRIM, supra note
4, § 1.03.
22.
See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722.
23.
See Incase Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Learning
Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722.
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While the measures need not be perfect or even ultimately successful,
the owner cannot merely sit back and do nothing.24 Thus, courts
consider the extent to which the information is known by employees
and others involved in the owner’s business, as well as the measures
taken by the owner to guard the secrecy of the information from
outside parties.25
According to Sissela Bok, “[t]rade secrets are [c]ompany assets.
They were developed at great expense and only after long periods of
experimentation.”26 Under John Locke’s labor theory of property,
people have a right to what they have made.27 Protecting trade
secrets encourages continued investment and innovation,28 helps to
maintain commercial ethics,29 and allows for protected disclosure of
the information to partners and employees.30
However, trade secret protection can be lost in the blink of an
eye.31 It takes little time to copy large amounts of information,32
24.
See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80 (7th Cir.
1991); see also E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)
(“[A]n impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement . . . .”); Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d
1279, 1284 (Vt. 2001).
25.
See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 722.
26.
BOK, supra note 1, at 146.
27.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1689) (“Whatsoever,
then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”); see
BOK, supra note 1, at 143 (“[A] view of property expressed most forcefully by Locke [is] that
individuals have a right to what they have made, joined their labor to, or worked to wrest from
nature.”); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,
28–33 (2007) (discussing the influence of Lockean theory on trade secret protection).
28.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also BOK, supra
note 1, at 147–48.
29.
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481–82; MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01.
30.
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485–86 (stating that if trade secret protection were
unavailable, “[s]ecurity precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and fringe
benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret invention
would be fixed in an amount thought sufficient to assure their loyalty. Smaller companies would
be placed at a distinct economic disadvantage . . . .” (footnote omitted)); MILGRIM, supra note 4,
§ 1.01 (“[R]easonable use of a trade secret including controlled disclosure to employees and
licensees is consistent with the requirement of relative secrecy.”); ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON
K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW 1 (2012) (“If the requirements of
trade secret law are met, the holder of an idea or other bit of information can share it with others
without losing legal protection. In this way, trade secret law is believed to encourage innovation,
invention, and creativity and to facilitate the sharing of information.”).
31.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 144–45 (“Unlike most forms of property, trade secrets are
of an ephemeral nature. They may be lost merely from being photographed or even seen; they
may evaporate as a result of someone’s facial expression at the moment one guesses at a formula.
Controls over exclusivity, permanence, and transmissibility are more fragile for trade secrets
than for other property; unusual secrecy is therefore needed to guard them.”).
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especially in the digital age.33 Previously, trade secret information
could be protected by locking it in a safe or filing cabinet behind a
locked office door inside a secure building.34 Now a trade secret can be
lost within seconds.35 Nearly everyone is carrying a cell phone that
allows them to record sounds, snap pictures, and take videos;
employees can email files to themselves (or others), download files to a
removable drive that can be easily carried off-site, or upload files to
the cloud;36 angry ex-employees can anonymously publish company
trade secrets online; operators can maneuver drones to peer inside
property;37 and hackers can gain access to a company’s computer
system from down the street or from the other side of the globe.38
Each year, roughly $300 billion of trade secrets are stolen from US
businesses.39 As a result, the need for new technologically evolving
and tighter secrecy measures has grown.40

32.
See id. at 148 (“To develop new processes and achieve new knowledge in industry
takes time and often great resources; to copy them, very little.”).
33.
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2009).
34.
See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.04 (citing State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay
Mkt. of Cincinnati, 988 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Ohio 2013); McClain v. State, 269 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2008)).
35.
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting the Internet “facilitates
complete destruction of a trade secret in an instant”); Michael H. Bunis & Anna Dray-Siegel, You
Need to Work Harder to Fight Trade Secret Theft, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:38 PM),
https://www.choate.com/uploads/1178/doc/Bunis,_Dray-Siegel_-_Law360_-_You_Need_To_Work_
Harder_To_Fight_Trade_Secret_Theft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C4S-HC3R] (“[A]n electronically
stored trade secret can be stolen with little more than the click of mouse [sic], particularly if an
employee already has access to trade secret information. An employee intent on stealing trade
secret information may send it using a Web-based personal email account, download it to a
personal USB drive, or upload it to a community or public cloud, all without alerting his or her
employer.”).
36.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484, 2489 (2014); Jenna M. Andrews, Note,
An Inside Job: The Intersection of Federal Computer Law and Trade Secret Law in Cases of
Insider Misappropriation, 18 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 176 (2017); see also Bunis & Dray-Siegel,
supra note 35 (“Use of . . . cloud computing infrastructures such as Dropbox[] creates additional
opportunities for determined employees to disclose or send trade secret information outside of
the organization.”).
37.
See Declan McCullagh, Technology as Security, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129,
138–39 (2001); Wayne Bond, Drones & Trade Secrets—How Low Can They Go?, SEYFARTH SHAW:
TRADING SECRETS (May 9, 2016), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2016/05/articles/tradesecrets/drones-trade-secrets-how-low-can-they-go/ [https://perma.cc/85RC-ZVNP].
38.
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rats, Traps, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 381–82
(2016) (“Technology has facilitated both the amount of trade secrets that are now stored
electronically, and the rise of cyber intrusions.”).
39.
Jeffries et al., supra note 7.
40.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING
THE
THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-

1142

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:4:1135

III. THE NEGATIVES OF SECRECY
Not surprisingly, there are also negatives involved in
protecting trade secrets—namely, providing a legal shield that
corporations can use to conceal nefarious activities. According to Bok,
“[t]rade secrecy is the most frequent claim made by those who want to
protect secrets in business”; corporations may assert such claims to
protect legitimate secrets and, in some cases, to abuse or exploit their
trade secret protections.41
Trade secrecy can cause harm. First, trade secrecy does not
always promote one of its stated policy goals—innovation.42 Rather, it
encourages companies to engage in duplicative investment in research
and development.43 It also frustrates the disclosure goals of the
patent system when companies opt for trade secrecy rather than
patent protection.44

ccips/file/938321/download [https://perma.cc/7Z6M-RKL5] (“Emerging trends indicate that the
pace of economic espionage and trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating . . . .
Trade secret theft threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and places the
security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.”).
41.
BOK, supra note 1, at 136.
42.
See CLAIRE HOPE CUMMINGS, UNCERTAIN PERIL: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE
FUTURE OF SEEDS 81–82 (2008) (“Private property rights are fundamental to our economic
system, and they have extended their reach into every aspect of our lives. . . . It has gone too far,
however, and the overuse of intellectual property rights is stifling innovation. . . . When research
was being conducted openly and in the public interest, it was shared by publication. But now
intellectual property rights and patents constrict this activity and limit what is studied.”).
43.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012). Trade secrets are not “generally known” or
“readily ascertainable” by others. See id. If kept secret, then the trade secret can last forever. See
id. Unlike patents, which require dissemination of information in exchange for a limited
monopoly, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534
U.S. 124, 142 (2001), trade secret owners are required to prevent disclosure of the claimed
information, see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85
(1974); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). Given that
independent creation and reverse engineering of trade secret information are permitted,
companies in the same discipline often spend valuable resources trying to create the same
information, which results in duplication of investment. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
In fact, it is possible for two companies to independently develop the same trade secret
information. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl.
1961); Fishkin v. Susquehanna Partners, G.P., 563 F. Supp. 2d 547, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Doing
so does not destroy the trade secret, as long as disclosure does not occur. See Fishkin, 563 F.
Supp. 2d at 582. Rather, those companies are independent owners of the same trade secret. See
du Pont, 288 F.2d at 911.
44.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 140 (“[C]ompanies are resorting more often to trade
secrecy, even when patenting is a possibility.”); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 486–87, 489
(“The interest of the public is that the bargain of 17 years of exclusive use in return for disclosure
be accepted. If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that
holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state
protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue
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Second, secrecy debilitates judgment.45 If only a select few
know the trade secret, then they are the only ones who can make
decisions regarding the information at issue. This postpones discovery
of errors and effectively shuts out criticism from others who may be
able to provide valuable feedback.46 As a result, faulty assumptions
about risk may mean that little to no deliberation takes place
regarding whether to continue, modify, or cease use of the trade
secret.47
Third, secrecy has the capacity to corrupt and to invite abuse.48
Due to others’ lack of knowledge regarding the trade secret, those with
knowledge operate in a system free from oversight.49 This lack of
accountability coupled with the desire for higher profits (for which
they are held accountable) results in a loosening of moral
constraints.50 When no one is present to hold a mirror up to their
faces, they can downplay the consequences of their actions and
disregard any negative impacts the trade secret may have on their
employees, their consumers, the general public, or the environment.
to exist.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623,
624 (2013).
45.
BOK, supra note 1, at 25 (“Secrecy can harm those who make use of it in several
ways. It can debilitate judgment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback,
leading people to become mired down in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and
ways of thinking. Neither their perception of a problem nor their reasoning about it then receives
the benefit of challenge and exposure. Scientists working under conditions of intense secrecy
have testified to its stifling effect on their judgment and creativity.”).
46.
See id. at 26 (“[S]ecrecy can hamper the exercise of rational choice at every step: by
preventing people from adequately understanding a threatening situation, from seeing the
relevant alternatives clearly, from assessing the consequences of each, and from arriving at
preferences with respect to them.”).
47.
See id. at 196 (“[Secrecy] thwarts reasoning: it limits the perception of problems and
of alternative ways to approach them, prevents adequate deliberation, and deflects critical
feedback, thus restricting choice and decision.”).
48.
See id. at 123 (“Confidentiality, like all secrecy, can then cover up for and in turn
lead to a great deal of error, injury, pathology, and abuse.”); id. at 166 (“[M]ilitary secrecy . . .
insulates from criticism and feedback, and thus opens the door to abuse . . . .”); Wendy E.
Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law To Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1645, 1701 (2004) (“Using broad
trade secret protections, manufacturers impede public access to a large body of information
regarding their manufacturing processes, testing data, and the contents of their toxic products
and waste streams. . . . Firms that are unenthusiastic about granting public access to
information on the harms created by their products and activities face few restraints in abusing
these generous trade secret protections.”).
49.
See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 189 (2007) (“[T]rade secrecy by its very definition abhors
both transparency and public accountability.”).
50.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 173 (“To the extent that rulers become convinced of their
rightful freedom from oversight and from ordinary moral constraints, they grow predictably more
corrupt and exploitative.”).
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IV. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE
Corporations assert trade secrecy for a number of reasons,51
some of which are improper. For decades, companies have been
introducing new products, such as cigarettes,52 asbestos fibers,53
pesticides (namely, DBCP),54 and lead paint55 into the market. The
51.
See id. at 147 (“[C]orporations conceal their activities and especially their plans from
many others: from shareholders who might question investments and links to other companies;
from the government, in order to avoid interference and the publicity that may surround
information once it is given over into the government’s hands; from consumers, in order not to
lose business; and from employees about such matters as hidden dangers at the workplace,
imminent relocation plans, and risks of bankruptcy.”).
52.
See CLIVE BATES & ANDY ROWELL, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO EXPLAINED: THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY . . . IN ITS OWN WORDS 1, http://www.who.int/tobacco/
media/en/TobaccoExplained.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBL3-4RN2] (last visited Apr. 19, 2018);
NORBERT HIRSCHHORN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS: WHAT THEY
ARE, WHAT THEY TELL US, AND HOW TO SEARCH THEM 5, http://www.who.int/tobacco/
communications/TI_manual_content.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ22-ASQK] (last visited Mar. 14,
2018) (“In 1998, six million once secret documents from seven cigarette manufacturers doing
business in the US became available to the public as a result of legal action.”); Ryan Jaslow, Big
Tobacco Kept Cancer Risk in Cigarettes Secret: Study, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:18 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-tobacco-kept-cancer-risk-in-cigarettes-secret-study/
[https://perma.cc/2ANM-X888] (“New research suggests that tobacco companies have known for
40 years that cigarette smoke contains cancer-causing particles, but deliberately hid the
information from the public.”).
53.
See DANIEL STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: SCIENCE,
EVIDENCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 71 (2014) (“Reports of harmful effects of asbestos on
lungs date to 1898.”); Lorraine Mallinder, Deadly Secret: A 1940s Whistle-Blower Uncovers
Hidden Evidence Linking Asbestos to Cancer, CAN.’S HIST., Apr.–May 2011, at 33, 33–38,
https://mallinder.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/asbestos.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WRU4-CS3G]
(regarding similar secrecy tactics in Canada); Jim Morris, Facing Lawsuits Over Deadly
Asbestos, Paper Giant Launched Secretive Research Program, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19,
2014, 12:19 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/21/13559/facing-lawsuits-over-deadlyasbestos-paper-giant-launched-secretive-research [https://perma.cc/CR32-CK9M]; Bill Richards,
New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-Up of Effects on Workers, WASH. POST
(Nov. 12, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/12/new-data-onasbestos-indicate-cover-up-of-effects-on-workers/028209a4-fac9-4e8b-a24c-50a93985a35d/
?utm_term=.30acab7443fc [https://perma.cc/P3NS-NDHU] (“Documents uncovered in a series of
recent lawsuits indicate that for more than three decades the nation’s largest asbestos companies
hid evidence about potentially fatal effects of asbestos exposure on millions of U.S. workers.”).
54.
See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report 56:50–57:29 (PBS television broadcast, Moyers &
Co. 2001), http://billmoyers.com/content/trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/2G4E-76XK]. For access
to the transcript, see Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report Program Transcript, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/transcript.html [https://perma.cc/K27A-9VR9] (last visited Apr.
1, 2018). Around 1977, the public learned that 1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP), which Dow,
Occidental, and Shell all produced, is “a reproductive toxicant, a very powerful carcinogen.” See
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra, at 54:02–58:21; see also EPA, 1, 2-DIBROMO-3CHLOROPROPANE (DBCP) (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/
1-2-dibromo-3-chloropropane.pdf [https://perma.cc/72RU-Y5QV] (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR EVNTL.
ASSESSMENT, EPA, INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM (IRIS): 1, 2-DIBROMO-3CHLOROPROPANE (DBCP) (1991), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/
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public later discovered that these products were dangerous. For
decades, however, companies used trade secrecy to conceal the
dangerous
aspects
of
their
products.56
The
following
examples—perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), vinyl chloride, and
benzene—merely scratch the surface of companies’ use of trade secrets
to hide known health dangers from the public.57
A. Perfluorooctanoic Acid
In 1951, the chemical company DuPont began purchasing
PFOA, a man-made biopersistent and bioaccumulative chemical, from
the 3M Company to aid in its manufacture of Teflon, a nonstick

subst/0414_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRX4-5Y7W]); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra,
at 56:24–56:49 (narrating a Dow Chemical Research Laboratory memorandum from July 23,
1958: “Testicular atrophy may result from prolonged repeated exposure. A tentative hygiene
standard of 1 part per million is suggested.”); id. at 57:56–58:16 (narrating an Occidental
interoffice memorandum from April 29, 1975: “We are slowly contaminating all wells in our area
and two of our own wells are contaminated to the point of being toxic to animals or humans.
THIS IS A TIME BOMB THAT WE MUST DE-FUSE.”).
55.
See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 88–91 (2013) (discussing secret internal documents which
reveal that the lead paint industry knew the dangers that lead caused decades before the public’s
discovery); Luke Broadwater, Advocates Say Lead Paint Industry Should Be Held Liable in
Poisoning
of
Baltimore
Children,
BALT.
SUN
(Feb.
27,
2016,
4:14
PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-ci-lead-poisoning20160227-story.html [https://perma.cc/DDH9-MNE5] (“The paint industry knew about the
dangers of lead, and they still sold lead-based paint to the public.”).
56.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 146; see also Jaslow, supra note 52; Kristen Lombardi,
Benzene and Worker Cancers: ‘An American Tragedy’, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 7, 2014,
3:37
PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/12/04/16320/benzene-and-worker-cancersamerican-tragedy [https://perma.cc/9FBU-X2Z2]; Morris, supra note 53; Nathaniel Rich, The
Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worstnightmare.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KUT8-9G4H]; Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note
54, at 10:57–11:36.
57.
See STEEL, supra note 53, at 71 (“There are numerous examples of environmental
problems in which effective action was preceded by extended delays, during which time harms
accumulated that ultimately resulted in a much greater mess to clean up than if prompt action
had been taken. . . . [T]he history of environmental policy is replete with many additional cases:
asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), and
leaded gasoline to name just a few. In most cases, the time lapse between the initial evidence of
harm and effective regulatory action was a decade or more, and in some instances, as in the case
of asbestos, it was over a century.”); see also Susan Scutti, Study: Public Water Supply Is Unsafe
for Millions of Americans, CNN (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/health/
contaminated-water/index.html [https://perma.cc/RLR8-UPYS] (“Millions of Americans may be
drinking water with unsafe levels of industrial chemicals . . . . These chemicals, known as
polyfluoroalkyl and perfluoroalkyl substances or PFASs, have been linked to high cholesterol,
obesity, hormone suppression—and even cancer. Introduced more than 60 years ago, PFASs are
a category of man-made chemicals that degrade very slowly, if at all, in the environment.”).
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coating applied to skillets and pans.58 In addition to cookware, PFOA
was ultimately used in hundreds of other products, including food
containers, clothing, and carpet.59
By 1961, through self-funded, secret medical studies, DuPont
became aware that PFOA was dangerous,60 yet the company remained
silent.61
Meanwhile,
employees
regularly
contracted
“Teflon flu”—exemplified by “fever, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting—after
working in one of the PFOA storage tanks.”62 Employees were
instructed not to bring their work clothes home anymore.63
3M also reported several concerns to DuPont. In 1978, 3M told
DuPont that PFOA had been detected in the blood of workers at a
plant that manufactured the chemical.64 In 1981, 3M reported that
PFOA caused birth defects in rats.65 Thereafter, DuPont learned that
two of its seven pregnant female employees gave birth to children with
facial deformities.66
Despite these health concerns and 3M’s recommendations for
how to properly dispose of PFOA—through incineration or disposal at
58.
Rich, supra note 56; see Michael Hawthorn, INTERNAL WARNINGS: Industry
Memos Show DuPont Knew for Decades That a Chemical Used to Make Teflon Is Polluting
Workers and Neighbors, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2003); see also Opening Brief of
Appellants at 6, Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 101166) (stating that PFOA “persists in the environment and accumulates in living organisms over
time”); Editorial, Despite Clear Dangers, DuPont Kept Using a Toxic Chemical, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/opinion/despite-clear-dangers-dupont-kept-usinga-toxic-chemical.html [https://perma.cc/J4YR-7DM8].
59.
See Sharon Kelly, DuPont’s Deadly Deceit: The Decades-Long Cover-Up Behind the
“World’s Most Slippery Material”, SALON (Jan. 4, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2016/01/
04/teflons_toxic_legacy_partner/ [https://perma.cc/22AE-GS9U]; Dennis Thompson, Are There
Toxins in Your Fast Food Packaging?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:43 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/toxins-in-fast-food-packaging-pfoa-pfos/ [https://perma.cc/HD8HADLG].
60.
See Rich, supra note 56 (noting that PFOA, which was resistant to degradation,
could increase the size of the liver in rats, rabbits, and dogs); see also Hawthorn, supra note 58;
Tiffany Kary & Denise Trowbridge, Dupont, Chemours Handed Another Loss in Teflon Chemical
Case, BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2016, 3:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0706/dupont-loses-third-case-over-teflon-toxin-chemours-to-pay
[https://perma.cc/R5P2-P2SP];
Kelly, supra note 59 (“Concerns about the potential toxicity of [PFOA] had been raised internally
within DuPont by at least 1954, leading DuPont’s own researchers to conclude by at least 1961
that [PFOA] was toxic and, according to DuPont’s own Toxicology Section Chief, should be
‘handled with extreme care.’”).
61.
See Kary & Trowbridge, supra note 60.
62.
Rich, supra note 56.
63.
See id.
64.
See Sharon Lerner, The Teflon Toxin: DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception,
INTERCEPT (Aug. 11, 2015, 5:35 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/08/11/dupont-chemistrydeception/ [https://perma.cc/89PM-XBGW].
65.
Hawthorn, supra note 58; Rich, supra note 56.
66.
Kelly, supra note 59; Rich, supra note 56.
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chemical waste facilities—DuPont discharged “hundreds of thousands
of pounds of PFOA powder” into the Ohio River and stored “7,100 tons
of PFOA-laced sludge” in its facility’s digestion ponds, “open, unlined
pits . . . from which the chemical could seep into the ground.”67 As a
result, PFOA entered the drinking water supply of over one hundred
thousand people.68 By 1984, DuPont knew that drinking water across
the Ohio River was contaminated.69
However, the health risks were outweighed by the monetary
rewards. An internal document dated later in 1984 stated that while
the “[l]egal and medical [departments] will likely take the position of
total elimination,” the company executives concluded that cutting
pollution was “not ‘economically attractive.’”70 Therefore, rather than
reducing its use of PFOA, DuPont increased production.71 It also
continued to keep the dangers related to PFOA exposure secret.72
Additional studies echoed earlier warnings, yet DuPont
continued to put its profit before public welfare. In 1990, a study
showed that 3M employees with long-term exposure to PFOA had
higher rates of death from prostate cancer than employees who were
not exposed.73
Internal documentation indicated that “DuPont
understood that PFOA caused cancerous testicular, pancreatic and
liver tumors in lab animals.”74 Rather than developing a less toxic or
less risky alternative, DuPont decided to continue using PFOA.75 As
the New York Times noted, “[t]he risk was too great” given that PFOA
products were “worth $1 billion in annual profit.”76
When its own safety limits were exceeded, the company
remained silent and merely revised the safety limit so as to stay
within the threshold. In 1991, DuPont set an internal safety limit of

67.
Rich, supra note 56.
68.
Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“By 2001, . . . [PFOA] had seeped into the water
supply of at least six public water systems in West Virginia and Ohio.”).
69.
Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 7; see Hawthorn, supra note 58
(reporting that an August 29, 1984 “personal and confidential” memorandum from DuPont
stated that PFOA was found in drinking water on both sides of the Ohio River); Kary &
Trowbridge, supra note 60; Kelly, supra note 59 (“In 1984, DuPont began to secretively collect
local tap water, asking employees to bring in jugs of water from their own homes, schools, and
local businesses, and discovered that [PFOA] was making its way into public drinking water
supplies in both Ohio and West Virginia at potentially dangerous levels.”).
70.
Kelly, supra note 59.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Hawthorn, supra note 58.
74.
Rich, supra note 56.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
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one part per billion for PFOA concentration in drinking water.77
However, DuPont later found that one local water district contained
PFOA levels at three times that amount.78 At no time did DuPont
notify regulators or the public.79 Instead, DuPont merely adopted a
new threshold of 150 parts per billion.80
Eight years later, in 1999, Robert Bilott filed a federal suit
against DuPont on behalf of Wilbur Tennant, a farmer whose cattle
were dying after drinking water near DuPont’s facility.81 During
discovery Bilott uncovered fifty-year-old documents that indicated
DuPont had long been aware of the dangers of PFOA.82 Thereafter,
the parties settled for an undisclosed sum.83
Although 3M ceased production of PFOA in 2000, DuPont
continued to produce and use PFOA for another thirteen years.84
During this time, a DuPont scientist stated in a 2001 email that
“when airborne, [PFOA] is so hard to deal with that ‘it might require
the public to wear gas masks.’”85
Despite actual knowledge of PFOA’s toxicity and that its
facilities had discharged PFOA into the surrounding drinking water,
DuPont concealed this information from the public for fear that
residents might seek to stop the company.86 Troubled by DuPont’s
continuing concealment of this health hazard, Bilott sent a 972-page
letter (along with 136 attached exhibits) to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) on March 6, 2001.87 In it, he urged the EPA

77.
Id. (“In Little Hocking, the water tested positive for PFOA at seven times the
limit.”).
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“[A 2001 email by DuPont’s in-house counsel]
shows that company officials planned to push regulators to allow the public to be exposed to
higher levels of the chemical than DuPont itself had recommended. . . . [Counsel] wrote: ‘So far
DuPont has been saying there are safe levels, we need to have an independent agency agree, we
are hoping that it will agree to higher levels than we have been saying. If for no other reason
than we are exceeding the levels we say we set as our own guideline, mostly because no one
bothered to do air monitoring until now, and our water test has been completely inadequate.’”).
81.
Rich, supra note 56; see also Kelly, supra note 59 (“Within a few years, about 280 of
Tennant’s cattle, which drank water from the creek, had died. When the Tennants cut open a
cow to investigate the cause of its death, they discovered that its internal organs had turned
bright, neon green . . . . Tennant and his family members, too, suffered breathing difficulties and
cancers.”).
82.
Rich, supra note 56.
83.
Lerner, supra note 64.
84.
Rich, supra note 56.
85.
Kelly, supra note 59.
86.
See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 12.
87.
Rich, supra note 56.
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to regulate PFOA immediately and provide clean water to affected
persons.88
This action opened a lengthy investigation by the EPA.89 In
2004, the EPA filed a lawsuit against DuPont based on the company’s
two-decade concealment of PFOA’s risks.90 In 2005, the EPA reached
a $16.5 million settlement with DuPont for its failure to report such
health risks.91 This settlement accounted for the highest civil penalty
ever assessed by the EPA,92 yet the fine amounted to less than 2
percent of DuPont’s profits from PFOA in that year alone.93
Furthermore, DuPont was not required to immediately pull PFOA
from the market.94 Despite the Ohio EPA’s classification of PFOA as a
toxic air pollutant,95 DuPont and the federal EPA negotiated a
voluntary phase-out by 2015.96
The effects of DuPont’s decades-long use of PFOA had tragic
consequences. Between 1999 and 2012, PFOA was found in the blood
samples of 99 percent of the US population.97 The chemical was
“detected in water, wildlife, and humans worldwide.”98 Animal studies
resulted in developmental defects, liver toxicity, kidney toxicity,
immune defects, and cancer.99 Meanwhile, “[h]uman epidemiology
data report associations between PFOA exposure and high cholesterol,
increased liver enzymes, decreased vaccination response, thyroid
disorders, pregnancy-induced hypertension and preeclampsia, and
cancer (testicular and kidney).”100 According to the EPA, “a single
exposure to a developmental toxin at a critical time in development
can produce an adverse effect.”101 Further, the effects of short-term
exposure can last for years and are exacerbated by additional

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Kelly, supra note 59.
91.
Juliet Eilperin, DuPont, EPA Settle Chemical Complaint, WASH. POST
(Dec.
15,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/14/
AR2005121402275.html [https://perma.cc/R6VU-9WGX].
92.
Id.
93.
Rich, supra note 56.
94.
Kelly, supra note 59.
95.
Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 11.
96.
Kelly, supra note 59.
97.
EPA, DOC. NO. 822-R-16-005, DRINKING WATER HEALTH ADVISORY FOR
PERFLUOROOCTANOIC ACID (PFOA) 9 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201605/documents/pfoa_health_advisory_final_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W56F-9F7M].
98.
Id. at 11.
99.
Id. at 9, 35–39, 44–45; see also Rich, supra note 56.
100.
EPA, supra note 97, at 9, 39–42, 45–46; see also Rich, supra note 56.
101.
EPA, supra note 97, at 10.
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exposures.102 As a result of these findings, the EPA issued a safety
limit for PFOA of 0.07 micrograms per liter or 70 parts per trillion.103
In December 2011, independent scientists began releasing their
findings.104
They confirmed what DuPont had known for
105
decades —that “there was a ‘probable link’ between PFOA and
kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, preeclampsia and ulcerative colitis.”106
Once these secrets were revealed, civil lawsuits were filed by
those affected. In October 2015, DuPont was found liable in the first
of 3,535 personal-injury lawsuits.107 The jury awarded that plaintiff
$1.6 million in damages.108 In July 2016, a second lawsuit against
DuPont resulted in an award of $5.1 million in compensatory
damages, along with $500,000 in punitive damages due to DuPont’s
malice.109
B. Vinyl Chloride
Another toxic chemical—vinyl chloride—was processed into
PVC plastic.110 PVC is used in a range of household and industrial
products, “from raincoats and shower curtains to window frames and
indoor plumbing.”111

102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 9. One microgram per liter is equal to one part per billion. TERRIE K. BOGUSKI,
CTR. FOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RESEARCH, BROWNFIELDS RESOURCES: UNDERSTANDING UNITS
OF MEASURE 1 (2006), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.files/
fileID/14285 [https://perma.cc/22CF-AX2Q]. “A way to visualize one part per billion (ppb) in
water is to think of it as one drop in one billion drops of water . . . .” Id.
104.
Rich, supra note 56.
105.
Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 10–12 (“The toxic and hazardous
nature of PFOA was confirmed by DuPont’s experts in August 2004: ‘the epidemiological and
scientific literature . . . indicates . . . that there is a risk of adverse human health effects from
exposure to [PFOA]’ including ‘liver disease or liver effects’ and ‘cancers,’ including ‘kidney
cancer in particular, in those exposed to [PFOA].’ That expert noted ‘cholesterol abnormalities’
that suggested potential cardiovascular implications.” (citations omitted)).
106.
Rich, supra note 56; see also Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 58, at 9–10.
107.
Rich, supra note 56; see also Kelly, supra note 59.
108.
Kary & Trowbridge, supra note 60; Kelly, supra note 59.
109.
Jessica Dye, DuPont Must Pay Extra $500,000 in Lawsuit over Teflon-Making
Chemical, REUTERS (July 8, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dupont-verdictidUSKCN0ZO21V [https://perma.cc/8J3R-AMF8].
110.
EPA, VINYL CHLORIDE 1 (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201609/documents/vinyl-chloride.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3FL-Q7MG]; Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report,
supra note 54, at 10:56–11:10.
111.
Polyvinyl
Chloride:
Chemical
Compound,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/polyvinyl-chloride
[https://perma.cc/H7EM-FQV3]
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2018).
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Documents uncovered during a lawsuit in the 1990s indicate
that the industry knew for decades that vinyl chloride was
dangerous.112 For example, a May 1959 document to the Director of
the Department of Industrial Hygiene at the BF Goodrich Company
stated that “[w]e have been investigating vinyl chloride a bit. . . . We
feel quite confident that 500 parts per million is going to produce
rather appreciable injury when inhaled 7 hours a day, five days a
week for an extended period.”113 Meanwhile, workers were being
regularly exposed to at least 500 parts per million.114 Seven years
later, an October 6, 1966, BF Goodrich memo stated that “[t]he clinical
manifestations are such as to suggest the possibility of a disabling
disease as a later development. . . . [The company is] worried about
possible long term effect on body tissue especially if it proves to be
systemic.”115 Yet the company continued to keep these dangers secret
from its workforce.116
BF Goodrich was not alone in keeping this information secret.
Intercompany correspondence at Union Carbide, dated November 24,
1959, stated that “[v]inyl chloride monomer is more toxic than has
been believed.”117 Moreover, companies communicated with one
another about these risks. A communication from BF Goodrich to
Union Carbide, Imperial Chemical, and Monsanto stated that “[t]here
is no question that skin lesions, absorption of bone of the terminal
joints of the hands, and circulatory changes can occur in workers
associated with the polymerization of PVC. . . . Of course, the
confidentiality of this data is exceedingly important.”118 Thus, the
companies marked these documents “secret” and “confidential.”119
And in the early 1970s—amid additional reports stating that “the
results on rats are probably undeniable”120 and that “[a]ll agreed the
results certainly indicate a positive carcinogenic effect above or at 250
parts per million”121—European and US chemical companies signed an

112.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 6:58–11:39; see also Trade Secrets:
The Documents, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/program/vinyl.html [https://perma.cc/
9D3L-3E3C] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (providing supporting documents to the documentary).
113.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 12:15–12:35.
114.
Id. at 12:46–12:51.
115.
Id. at 18:00–18:50.
116.
Id. at 17:29–18:00.
117.
Id. at 12:52–13:12.
118.
Id. at 15:25–16:00.
119.
See, e.g., id. at 28:00–28:30.
120.
Id. (highlighting Union Carbide’s confidential internal correspondence, dated Feb.
13, 1973).
121.
Compare id. (highlighting Ethyl Corporation’s internal communications regarding
vinyl chloride), with EPA, supra note 110, at 2 (“[The] EPA has established a Reference
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agreement not to disclose the identity of their researchers to industry
outsiders.122
Even after the federal government, through its newly created
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
requested all health and safety information regarding vinyl chloride in
1973,123 and a staff member of the industry’s trade association sent a
letter to member companies urging that they tell NIOSH their
findings, the industry did not provide such information to NIOSH.124
Meanwhile, those working in vinyl choloride plants “were being told
there was nothing to worry about, that there [was] no danger,” and
that the industry would “protect the work force.”125 Instead, the
companies paid the scientists to come to the conclusions the
companies wanted,126 thus corrupting the research.127 Rather than
studying the workers who were most directly exposed, the scientists
evaluated the workers on the margin of the process.128 Therefore, “[i]n
the end, the industry got a report that said what it wanted,”129 proving
that “[s]cience is easy to manipulate.”130

Concentration (RfC) of 0.1 milligrams per cubic meter, and a Reference Dose (RfD) of 0.003
milligrams per kilogram per day for vinyl chloride.”).
122.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 27:07–27:23.
123.
Id. at 28:43–29:05.
124.
See id. at 29:08–30:03 (reporting that an industry trade association letter to member
companies, dated March 26, 1973, stated: “There is the aspect of moral obligation not to withhold
from the Government significant information having occupational and environmental
relevance. . . .”).
125.
Id. at 32:30–32:48.
126.
Id. at 36:00–36:26.
127.
Id. at 36:26–36:46.
128.
Id. at 36:45–37:40.
129.
Id. at 40:10–40:14.
130.
Id. at 40:06–40:08.

2018]

WHEN TRADE SECRECY GOES TOO FAR

1153

The EPA now states that
[a]cute (short-term) exposure to high levels of vinyl chloride in air has resulted in
central nervous system effects (CNS), such as dizziness, drowsiness, and headaches
in humans. Chronic (long-term) exposure to vinyl chloride through inhalation and
oral exposure in humans has resulted in liver damage. Cancer is a major concern
from exposure to vinyl chloride via inhalation, as vinyl chloride exposure has been
shown to increase the risk of a rare form of liver cancer in humans. EPA has
classified vinyl chloride as a Group A, human carcinogen.131

While workers’ compensation was available to shield corporations
from suits by employees, no such mechanism was available to shield
corporations from suits by consumers.132 This possibility of unlimited
liability gave the industry pause with regard to use of vinyl chloride in
aerosols.133 As a result, companies began phasing out their use of
such products. However, they did so quietly; “[n]o public warning was
issued.”134
Thus, it is impossible to determine the number of
hairdressers and their customers who were sickened or died as a
result of exposure to vinyl chloride.135
In 1974, after a number of employees died from angiosarcoma
(a cancer of the liver), and over industry objections, the government
reduced permissible workplace exposure to vinyl chloride to one part
per million.136 Because the companies were able to keep the dangers
of vinyl chloride secret for fifteen years, they were able to keep making
money on these products despite the clear dangers posed to public
health.
C. Benzene
The American Cancer Society describes benzene as “a colorless,
flammable liquid with a sweet odor,” which “evaporates quickly when
131.
EPA, supra note 110, at 1.
132.
See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 43:45–44:10 (referring to a
Union Carbide internal correspondence as stating, “[i]f vinyl chloride proves to be hazardous to
health, a producing company’s liability to its employees is limited by various Workmen’s
Compensation laws”).
133.
See id. at 44:51–45:20 (quoting an Ethyl Corporation interoffice memorandum that
states Dow “is questioning the aspect of making sales of vinyl chloride monomer when the known
end use is as an aerosol propellant since [the] market is small but potential liability is great”); id.
at 45:22–45:37 (quoting an Allied Chemical Corporation memorandum’s admonition that “serious
consideration should be given to withdrawal from” the market for vinyl chloride monomer as
aerosol propellant); id. at 43:14–43:45 (quoting a BF Goodrich Chemical Company memorandum
dated March 24, 1969: “Calculations have been made to show the concentration of propellant in a
typical small hair dresser’s room. . . . All of this suggests that beauty operators may be exposed
to concentrations of vinyl chloride monomer equal to or greater than the level in our polys.”).
134.
Id. at 46:32–46:41.
135.
Id. at 46:43–46:58.
136.
Id. at 47:06–47:26, 49:49–49:58.
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exposed to air.”137 It is primarily used as a reagent for synthesizing
other chemicals, “including plastics, lubricants, rubbers, dyes,
detergents, drugs, and pesticides.”138 Historically, it was also used as
an industrial solvent—to “dissolve or extract other substances”—and
as a gasoline additive.139
“[A]s with vinyl chloride, the industry’s own medical officers
had known of benzene’s toxicity for a very long time.”140 In 1948, the
American Petroleum Institute’s toxicology profile of benzene
“discussed ‘reasonably well documented instances of the development
of leukemia as a result of chronic benzene exposure,’ cautioning that
‘the only absolutely safe concentration . . . is zero.’”141 This was echoed
in 1958 by Esso Oil’s medical research division, which stated that
“[m]ost authorities agree the only level which can be considered
absolutely safe for prolonged exposure is zero.”142 The industry
response was to shield internal records, disclosing them only on court
order.143
Subsequent lawsuits uncovered a trove of secret documents
detailing the industry’s campaign to undercut outside scientific
investigations.144 Indeed, the industry spent over $36 million on
counterresearch to protect its own economic interests.145 As a former
employee and whistleblower explained, “[i]t’s all about influencing
science to get what industry wants.”146 In this regard, benzene is “a

137.
Benzene and Cancer Risk, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/
cancercauses/othercarcinogens/intheworkplace/benzene
[https://perma.cc/A9JT-QFR2]
(last
updated Jan. 5, 2016).
138.
Id.; accord Lombardi, supra note 56.
139.
Benzene and Cancer Risk, supra note 137.
140.
See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 52:52–53:02; see also STEEL,
supra note 53, at 71 (“Reports of benzene causing aplastic anemia date to 1897, while the first
studies linking benzene to leukemia date to 1928. In the US, effective regulations on benzene
were not introduced until 1977, and implementation of these regulations were delayed a decade
further due to litigation.”).
141.
Lombardi, supra note 56.
142.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 53:03–53:27 (quoting a 1958 Esso
Oil memorandum).
143.
Lombardi, supra note 56.
144.
The American Petroleum Institute challenged the National Cancer Institute (NCI)
study “from every conceivable angle,” creating sufficient doubt regarding that study to persuade
the EPA not to rely on the NCI’s research in 2000. Id.
145.
Id. In advance of the industry’s studies, anticipated results were laid out: “[p]rovide
strong scientific support for a lack of a risk of leukemia[;] . . . [e]stablish . . . current occupational
exposure limits do not create a significant risk[; and] [r]efute the allegation that Non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma can be induced by benzene exposure.” Id.
146.
Id. (reporting a statement made by Mobil’s former chief toxicologist, Myron
Mehlman, “who became a whistleblower in 1989 after the company fired him for complaining
about benzene levels in its gasoline. He sued Mobil, winning a $7 million judgment.”); see also
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good example of how the general scientific literature is being polluted
by people working for industry.”147
Even “as evidence mounted connecting benzene to leukemia,”
the industry continued to challenge and delay regulations from going
into effect.148 Rather than changing its behavior, the petrochemical
industry turned to the courts to impede regulatory reform,149 arguing
that reduction of benzene exposure would be “too costly.”150
Benzene is now a known human carcinogen.151 As of May 2014,
the EPA “estimated that 5 million Americans—not counting those
with workplace exposures—face heightened cancer risks from benzene
and 68 other carcinogens spewed into the air by . . . the nation’s 149
oil refineries.”152 Countless lawsuits have been (and are still being)
filed.
Money clearly motivated this ongoing secrecy, despite the
repeated findings that such chemicals posed a danger to public
health.153 These companies wanted to continue making profits on the
products as they existed. They did not want to invest in research and
development to change the process or product in a manner that would
reduce or remove such dangers, and they did not want to be held
Morris, supra note 53 (detailing Georgia Pacific’s research program and publication of articles to
cast doubt on others’ scientific research regarding the dangers of asbestos exposure).
147.
Lombardi, supra note 56 (reporting a statement made by Peter Infante, “a former
director of the office that reviews health standards at the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, who has studied the pollutant for 40 years”).
148.
See Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 51:36–51:54 (“[T]he
Occupational Safety and Health Administration—OSHA—ordered that workplace exposure be
lowered to one part per million—a regulation the industry, then producing 11 billion pounds a
year, would challenge.”).
149.
See Lombardi, supra note 56 (“[Industry-financed scientific reports] play[ed] a
critical role in the benzene litigation, . . . . help[ing] companies deny liability by casting doubt on
causation, the central issue in a toxic-tort lawsuit.”).
150.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 54:20–54:35 (“The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in New Orleans—in America’s petrochemical heartland—ruled that the
government had not proved the danger to humans to be great enough to justify the cost to
industry.”).
151.
EPA, TOXICITY AND EXPOSURE ASSESSMENTS FOR CHILDREN’S HEALTH 1 (2009),
https://archive.epa.gov/region5/teach/web/pdf/benz_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5RF-VB5R];
Benzene and Cancer Risk, supra note 137; Lombardi, supra note 56.
152.
Lombardi, supra note 56.
153.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12 (“[T]hese companies were concerned not with
public health but with avoiding responsibility for the harm they caused.”); Richards, supra note
53 (“Now we know what they knew and did, and that was to try to put a lid on the whole thing
and keep on making money.”); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 1:04:27–1:04:44
(showing a portion of an interview with Jacqueline Warren, a former attorney for the Natural
Resources Defense Council, who stated that companies are “interested in their bottom line, their
stockholders, their product, and they’re not as interested at all in what the potential health or
safety or environmental effect of exposure to this might be”).
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publicly or monetarily accountable for the resultant injuries to their
employees, customers, or the neighboring public and environment. In
light of such historical trade secret abuse and the continuing
monetary motivation, suspicion that companies continue to engage in
such immoral practices remains. Such suspicion is not misplaced. As
veteran journalist Bill Moyers observed in his Trade Secrets report,
“[w]e think we are protected but, in fact, chemicals are presumed
safe—innocent—until proven guilty.”154
V. CURRENT EXAMPLES OF TRADE SECRECY ABUSE
As discussed above, the chemical revolution of the past sixty
years has produced thousands of man-made chemicals that have not
been tested for their effect on the public’s health and safety. Each
week, we are bombarded with new products and processes. Indeed,
“an average of twenty new chemicals enter the marketplace every
week,”155 and 80 percent of processed foods and a large percentage of
fresh foods are now genetically modified.156 Unfortunately, consumers
do not know much about what impact these materials will have on
human beings or the environment. 157 Consumers are, essentially,
acting as test subjects.
Hydraulic fracturing and genetically modified foods, discussed
in depth below, are two current examples of trade secrets that pose
potential dangers to human health. Other areas of current concern
include synthetic fragrances,158 cosmetics,159 e-cigarettes,160 and flame
154.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 0:33–0:40; see also Alissa Cordner,
Why Chemicals in the U.S. Are Still “Innocent Until Proven Guilty”, SMITHSONIAN (July 18,
2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-chemicals-us-are-still-innocent-untilproven-guilty-180959818/ [https://perma.cc/Q2TY-YPLE].
155.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 1:14:35–1:14:40 (emphasis added).
156.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 20; see Margie Kelly, Top 7 Genetically Modified Crops,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 5:05 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/margiekelly/genetically-modified-food_b_2039455.html [https://perma.cc/LT74-7C93].
157.
See Kelly, supra note 59 (“With no mandatory safety testing for the vast majority of
the tens of thousands of chemicals used daily in America, doctors and public health officials have
little information to guide them as they seek to identify potential health hazards . . . .”).
158.
See Brian Brinks, Why Do We Call a Spritz of Chemicals an “Air Freshener”?, LIFE
OF BRIAN: ENVTL. & SUSTAINABLE LIVING BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.lifeofbrian.ca/
index.php/2010/10/why-call-a-spritz-of-chemicals-an-air-freshener/ [https://perma.cc/7E7U-H3ZJ]
(“Most Shampoos, soaps, perfume/colognes, cosmetics, detergents, fabric softeners, cleaners,
candles . . . etc[.], contain synthetic ‘fragrance.’ [Yet,] the true chemical makeup of ‘fragrance’ is
tightly protected as a ‘trade secret.’”).
159.
See “Trade Secret” Ingredients, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/Labeling/
ucm414211.htm [https://perma.cc/UQ8J-YYLH] (last updated Nov. 4, 2017) (“FDA requires
cosmetics to have an ‘ingredient declaration,’ a list of all the product’s ingredients. . . . [However,]
fragrance and flavor ingredients do not need to be listed individually on cosmetic labels, because
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retardants.161 Although concerning, those products are not discussed
in detail within this Article.
Business records that hide nefarious activity—such as
mortgage lending practices,162 emissions records,163 donation
expenditures,164 and safety protocols165—are also capable of being
they are the ingredients most likely to be ‘trade secrets.’ Instead, they may be listed simply as
‘fragrance’ or ‘flavor.’”).
160.
See Don Hopey, New Rules Ban Sale of E-Cigs to Minors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(May 5, 2016, 9:01 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/health/2016/05/05/FDA-brings-ecigarettes-under-federal-authority-electronic-cigarettes-regulations/stories/201605050181
[https://perma.cc/VA4E-RYZ5] (“[B]ecause e-cigarettes are so new . . . it’s too soon to know their
long-term health impacts; studies, however, show the aerosol vapor can contain known carcinogens,
respiratory irritants and volatile organic compounds, including benzene, toluene and styrene.”).
161.
See Michael Hawthorn, Firemaster 550 the Latest Flame Retardant Allowed onto
Market Without Thorough Study, CHI. TRIB. (May 10, 2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-met-flames-regulators-20120510-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5UED-QH6V]
(“When
Firemaster 550 replaced penta, its chemical makeup was a mystery to all but the manufacturer
and a select group of EPA employees who were sworn to secrecy. That made it difficult for
outside scientists to identify its ingredients in the environment and determine if they are
harmful. . . . Chemtura already is marketing an alternative flame retardant called Emerald NH1. . . . The company says the polymer-based substance doesn’t contain bromine or chlorine, . . . .
[b]ut the ingredients remain a trade secret.”); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.20(a), 20.21(a), 20.61(c),
20.82(b), 20.111(c)(2), 20.111(d), 20.113(a) (2018).
162.
See Jennifer Liberto, Fed to Release Wall Street Crisis Loan Data,
CNN: MONEY (Mar. 21, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/21/news/economy/
fed_contracts_open_records/ [https://perma.cc/A5VK-69W7] (“Bloomberg LP, owner of Bloomberg
News, had filed the lawsuit seeking details on a program that gave banks access to cheap loans
in 2008. The Fed had originally refused to release the data, citing exemptions in open records
laws for trade secrets.”).
163.
See Volkswagen Case: Could Cheating on an Emissions Test Become a Protected
Trade Secret?, JULIA REDA (Sept. 10, 2015), https://juliareda.eu/2015/10/volkswagen-tradesecrets/ [https://perma.cc/87R2-VGYD] (“The European Parliament is currently negotiating the
Trade Secret Directive in trilogue. In this week’s plenary session I called on my colleagues: We
must be very careful not to include in that Directive new lines of defense for companies’ dirty
secrets.”).
164.
See Arit John, Red Cross Refuses to Disclose Full Details of Hurricane Sandy
Spending, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/06/red-cross-refusesto-disclose-details-of-hurricane-sandy-spending/373583/
[https://perma.cc/3X4N-K8A8];
Rob
Shwarts & Vann Pearce, DONATE, DON’T TELL? The Red Cross Says It Has Trade Secrets,
Upsetting
Activists,
ORRICK:
TRADE
SECRETS
WATCH
(July
17,
2014),
http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2014/07/17/donate-dont-tell-the-red-cross-says-it-hastrade-secrets-upsetting-activists/ [https://perma.cc/DL48-P4JR] (reporting that the Red Cross
argued that “information on how the Red Cross spent Hurricane Sandy relief donations”
qualified as “trade secrets exempt from New York’s Freedom of Information Law”); Debra
Cassens Weiss, Red Cross Claims Some Hurricane Sandy Spending Information Is a Trade
Secret, A.B.A. J. (June 30, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
red_cross_claims_some_hurricane_sandy_spending_information [https://perma.cc/2F8W-FLQA]
(“[The Red Cross’s counsel] argued that information about fundraising, internal operations and
finances should be exempt from disclosure. If the information were released, . . . ‘the American
Red Cross would suffer competitive harm because its competitors would be able to mimic the
American Red Cross’s business model for an increased competitive advantage.’”).
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protected as trade secrets, which may result in monetary harm to
others. This Article, however, focuses on those trade secrets that
cause direct or indirect physical harm to people.
A. Hydraulic Fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” involves the injection of
millions of gallons of fluid into shale beds at high pressure in order to
force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas.166 In 2015, there
were three hundred thousand fracking wells in the United States, up
from twenty-three thousand in the year 2000.167
While 99 percent of fracking fluid is composed of water and
sand, gas drillers add hundreds of chemicals to the mixture.168 Many
of these chemicals are classified as known or possible human
carcinogens.169
Studies indicate that fracking results in adverse health effects
to humans and livestock.170
People exposed have experienced

165.
See Jessica Mendelson, A Whale of a Trade Secret . . . or Not?, SEYFARTH SHAW:
TRADING SECRETS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/12/articles/tradesecrets/a-whale-of-a-trade-secret-or-not/
[https://perma.cc/7C6N-JRCF];
Mark
Patrick,
Seaworld’s Killer Whale Safety Protocols Withheld as Trade Secret, AM. U.: INTELL. PROP. BRIEF
(Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.ipbrief.net/2013/10/27/seaworlds-killer-whale-safety-protocolswithheld-as-trade-secret/ [https://perma.cc/6C7L-RCFX].
166.
See ALEX PRUD’HOMME, HYDROFRACKING: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 2
(2014).
167.
Matt Egan, Fracking Fallout: 7.9 Million at Risk of Man-Made Earthquakes, CNN:
MONEY (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/29/investing/earthquakesfracking-usgs-oil-gas/ [https://perma.cc/GQA4-2WYX].
168.
See JOHN LOCKE FOUND., SPOTLIGHT NO. 460, THE CHEMICALS IN FRACKING FLUIDS:
EARTH AND WATER, YOU’LL FIND PLENTY OF BOTH DOWN THERE 2 (2014),
https://www.johnlocke.org/app/uploads/2016/06/Spotlight460ChemicalsinFrackingFluids.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XR93-HXFR]; see also JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE LAW OF FRACKING § 10:11, at
110–11 (2015) (“[C]ompanies reported using more than 2,500 products containing 750 chemicals
and other components [between 2005 and 2009]—in a quarter of the products were chemicals
classified as ‘known or possible human carcinogens,’ which could have been regulated under the
Safe Drinking Water Act, or listed as hazardous air pollutants.”).
169.
See O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:11, at 110–11; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at
83 (citing OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVY9-865W]) (“While
some of the chemicals are common and benign—sodium chloride (used in table salt), borate salts
(used in cosmetics), or guar gum (used to make ice cream)—others contain toxic additives—such
as benzene (a carcinogen) or the solvent 2-Butoxyethanol, known as 2-BE. While they comprise a
tiny percentage of the mixture, hazardous exposure to some of these chemicals is measured in
the parts per million.”).
170.
See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 85 (stating that forty of the chemicals used in
fracking “had ‘the potential to cause multiple adverse health effects,’ and 19 . . . cause
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“burning of the eyes/nose/throat, headaches, rashes, nosebleeds, and
gastrointestinal distress,” as well as upper-respiratory problems,
“confusion,” “extreme fatigue . . . and sensory deficits.”171 Livestock
and pets exposed to fracking chemicals have died or been sickened and
have encountered reproductive defects.172 Moreover, exposed livestock
“are not tested for chemical contaminants before slaughter,” where
they then enter the food supply.173
In addition to the increase in earthquakes that appear related
to fracking,174 the process has had many deleterious effects on the
environment.
For example, “wastewater is frequently sent to
treatment plants that were not designed to treat it.”175 Two hundred
eighty billion gallons of wastewater were created in 2012 alone.176
Groundwater contamination has also occurred.177 Moreover, fracking

‘deleterious effects on the environment’” (quoting OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY
TECH. LAB., supra note 169)).
171.
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:12, at 114 (citing Michelle Bamberger & Robert E.
Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 NEW SOLUTIONS 51, 51–77
(2012)); see also id. § 10:1, at 102 (“Some of these chemicals are very hazardous in deep rock
layers, as well as on the surface while being pumped, and their unintended effects on humans on
the surface can be a persistent problem for those living nearby.”).
172.
Id. § 10:12, at 113 (citing Bamberger & Oswald, supra note 171, at 51–77).
173.
Id. § 10:12, at 114.
174.
See Egan, supra note 167 (reporting that seismic activity is on the rise in certain
energy-intensive states after a relatively stable thirty-year period); see also Jessica Fitzpatrick &
Mark Petersen, Induced Earthquakes Raise Chances of Damaging Shaking in 2016, USGS (Mar.
28, 2016, 12:46 PM), https://www2.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/induced-earthquakesraise-chances-of-damaging-shaking-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/U4JD-7Q5P].
175.
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:13, at 116–17; see also Ian Urbina, EPA Steps Up
Scrutiny of Pollution in Pennsylvania Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:59 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/science/earth/08water.html
[https://perma.cc/9Y9G-S722];
Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04gas.html [https://perma.cc/TB4N-ERAK]; Ian Urbina,
Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/PB6X-YJ2F].
176.
See O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:12, at 112 (citing Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas
Monthly
Supply
and
Disposition
Balance,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_sum_sndm_s1_m.htm
[https://perma.cc/2Z6C-U4PH]
(last
updated Mar. 30, 2018)).
177.
See id.; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 76 (citing Amy Mall, Incidents Where
Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of Drinking Water Contamination, NRDC: EXPERT
BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amy-mall/incidents-where-hydraulicfracturing-suspected-cause-drinking-water-contamination [https://perma.cc/F36K-Q2JR]) (“In
the United States, hydrofracking is suspected in at least 36 cases of groundwater contamination,
and in several cases EPA has determined that it was the likely source of pollution.”).
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has been linked “to unhealthy levels of smog and toxic air
contaminants.”178
Despite these harms, gas drillers have refused to disclose what
chemicals are used, claiming disclosure would instruct others on how
to use a similar combination in a similar shale bed.179 While that
know-how is likely to have value,180 the resulting damage to public
health is unacceptable.181
Unfortunately, hydraulic fracturing is exempt from all of the
environmental laws that would normally protect the public and the
environment—namely, the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the
Safe Drinking Water Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery

178.
NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, FRACKING FUMES: AIR POLLUTION FROM HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING
THREATENS
PUBLIC
HEALTH
AND
COMMUNITIES
2
(2014),
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/fracking-air-pollution-IB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2S7D6X4A]; see also EPA, OVERVIEW OF FINAL AMENDMENTS TO AIR REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET 3 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201609/documents/natural_gas_transmission_fact_sheet_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL2Y-G9X4]
(“The oil and gas industry is a significant source of VOCs, which contribute to the formation of
ground-level ozone (smog). . . . [S]ome of the largest air emissions in the natural gas industry
occur as natural gas wells that have been fractured are being prepared for production. During a
stage of well completion known as ‘flowback,’ fracturing fluids, water, and reservoir gas come to
the surface at a high velocity and volume. This mixture includes a high volume of VOCs and
methane, along with air toxics such as benzene, ethylbenzene and n-hexane. The typical
flowback process lasts from three to 10 days. Pollution also is emitted from other processes and
equipment in the industry that prepare gas for sale and that assist in moving it through
pipelines.”); PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND YOUR HEALTH:
AIR
CONTAMINATION,
http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/fracking-and-air-pollution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3T8H-3G3B] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
179.
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:1, at 102 (citing Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic
Fracturing: Two Thirds of Frack Disclosures Omit ‘Secrets’, E&E NEWS (Sept. 26, 2012),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970474 [https://perma.cc/8TP8-5RTY]); see id. § 10:11, at 111
(“[In a 2011 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce report,] some
oil and gas companies stated they did not have access to proprietary information about chemicals
they bought directly from suppliers: ‘In these cases, the companies are injecting fluids containing
chemicals that they themselves cannot identify.’” (quoting MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (2011)));
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 83–84.
180.
See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01 (“The definition [of trade secret] includes
information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of
lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could be of
great value to a competitor.”); O’REILLY, supra note 168, §§ 10:1–10:2, at 102–03 (“Halliburton
claimed that disclosure of its secret chemical formulas would cost it $375 million. . . . One might
presume that trial and error with differing levels and types of chemical ingredients has
costs . . . . Knowing what will work or what has not worked is ‘know-how’ that has an inchoate
value.”).
181.
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:3, at 104 (“The federal laws can allow a federal
agency over-ride of a company’s claim of confidential status for its chemicals. The health and
safety for the persons exposed to the mixture of chemicals may be in jeopardy. This risk scenario
is a sufficient reason why the identities of chemicals should be disclosed.” (citations omitted)).
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Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (or “Superfund”); the National Environmental Policy Act;
and the Toxic Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act.182 This leaves the United States with
a “patchwork” of state disclosure requirements, many of which offer
little—if any—protection to the public.183
In February 2014, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
advised the full disclosure of chemicals, proposing that companies
could publicly disclose all chemicals without revealing the exact
formula. In this regard, several companies have listed chemicals on
the industry website FracFocus.org.184
In October 2014,
Houston-based oil-field service company Baker Hughes began listing
all of the chemicals it uses, without detailing specific percentages or
amounts.185 The company’s chief strategy officer explained that

182.
William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the
United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government and Varying State
Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 43 (2012) (citing RENEE LEWIS KOSNIK, EARTHWORKS, THE
OIL
AND
GAS
INDUSTRY’S
EXCLUSIONS
AND
EXEMPTIONS
TO
MAJOR
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 2 (2007), https://earthworks.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/files/
publications/PetroleumExemptions1c.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS85-2FNX]); see also PRUD’HOMME,
supra note 166, at 70, 107 (“[W]hen the [Department of Interior] issued a new set of hotly
anticipated rules governing hydrofracking on public lands in May 2013, environmentalists were
dismayed. The new rules continue to allow energy companies to keep certain fracking chemicals
secret . . . .”).
183.
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 84 (citing Abraham Lustgarten, Natural Gas
Drilling Is at a Crucial Turning Point, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:09 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/21/natural-gas-drilling-turning-point
[https://perma.cc/EP2S-BNBM]). In Ohio, for example, the state fracking disclosure law
“prohibits anyone from accessing information about ‘trade secret’ fracking chemicals except the
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) or doctors treating a specific patient.” See
O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:14, at 119 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.10 et seq. (West
2015)). However, neither the ODNR nor doctors are allowed to share that information with
others, including those exposed. Id. “In Texas, legislators passed the nation’s first rules requiring
public disclosure of fracking chemicals.” See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 166, at 96 (citing Jennifer
Hiller, Frackers Avoid Fluid Disclosure Despite New Law, STATESMAN (Feb. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/frackers-avoid-fluid-disclosure-despite-newlaw/nWHKZ/ [https://perma.cc/Q3KZ-WQHY]). While the rules were designed to promote
transparency, that was not the result. See id. “Between April 2011 and early December 2012,
Texas drillers used terms such as ‘secret,’ ‘confidential,’ or ‘proprietary’ 10,120 times out of the
12,410 hydraulic fractures reported . . . .” Id.
184.
SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TASK FORCE REPORT ON
FRACFOCUS 2.0, at 2 (2014), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f8/FracFocus%
20TF%20Report%20Final%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPV-CX65]; see REBECCA FELIX, 12
THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT FRACKING 14–15 (2015); see also FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/
[https://perma.cc/FAD3-865M] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
185.
Eric Killelea, Baker Hughes Next to Disclose Formula, WILLISTON HERALD
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.willistonherald.com/news/baker-hughes-next-to-disclose-formula/
article_9bfd3616-4a5d-11e4-9bcd-97c1e2811492.html [https://perma.cc/9W7T-7DGT].
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[i]ntroducing greater transparency about the chemicals used in the hydraulic
fracturing process and protecting the ability to innovate are not conflicting
goals. . . . [Disclosure] is consistent with our belief that we are partners in solving
industry challenges, and that we have a responsibility to provide the public with
the information they want and deserve. It simultaneously enables us to protect
proprietary information that is critical to our growth.186

Yet the industry continues to lobby the EPA to protect trade
secrets by not requiring companies to reveal substances used in
fracking, arguing that “[h]ydraulic fracturing is a highly complex and
competitive industry where trade secrets are critical assets.”187 As a
result, trade secrecy continues to impede the public’s consideration of
what appears to be a hazard to the health of humans, animals, and
the environment.
B. Genetically Modified Organisms
[A]s food has become more complicated, the balance between trade secrets and
public disclosure has become more complicated. On one hand, manufacturers must
maintain trade secrets to protect their investments. On the other hand, consumers
want to know what ingredients are in food products, as well as how those
ingredients are made.188

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are organisms whose
genetic material has been altered using genetic engineering
techniques.189 Similarly, genetically modified foods are “plants and
animals that have had their genetic makeup artificially altered . . . to
make them grow faster, taste better, provide more nutrients, or last
longer.”190 This is done by transposing the DNA of one organism—a
plant, animal, or bacterium—with another “in order to change the
condition or character of the receiving organism.”191
There are three agencies involved in the regulation of
genetically modified foods: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),

186.
Id.
187.
US Chemical Manufacturers Lobby for Fracking Formula Secrecy, CHEMICALWATCH
(Sept. 30, 2014), https://chemicalwatch.com/21344/us-chemical-manufacturers-lobby-for-frackingformula-secrecy [https://perma.cc/6J6C-933B].
188.
Kelly Damewood, Food Ingredients: Trade Secrets vs. Public Disclosure, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/03/food-ingredients-tradesecrets-versus-public-disclosure/#.VritXfkrJD8 [https://perma.cc/92U2-CVZA].
189.
See Julie Hill, The Precautionary Principle and Release of Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMOS) to the Environment, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 172,
174 (Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
190.
KEVIN HILLSTROM, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 8 (2012).
191.
Id.
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the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the EPA.192 The FDA is
charged with regulating GMOs that become food or drugs,193 the
USDA is charged with regulating GMOs that are existing crops,194 and
the EPA is charged with regulating genetically modified pesticide
products.195 “All three agencies operate passively under a ‘don’t tell,
don’t look’ policy.”196 Under this policy, the government investigates
potential risks only after the industry first discloses them.197
The majority of Americans think the FDA does premarket
safety testing.198 It does not.199 In 1992, the FDA decided to consider
all genetically engineered food, prior to being studied, to be generally
regarded as safe (GRAS).200 Therefore, neither premarket testing nor
FDA approval is required before sale of GMO foods.201 Moreover,
192.
See KERRY H. WHITESIDE, PRECAUTIONARY POLITICS: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 14 (2006); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified
Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. 859, 876 (2011).
193.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12–13.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. at 13.
197.
See id.
198.
Id. at 14.
199.
Id.
200.
See HILLSTROM, supra note 190, at 18; see also CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14 (“If
something can be ‘generally regarded as safe’ (GRAS) under the act, as most conventional foods
are, then it is not regulated. Dr. Michael Hansen of Consumers Union says that the
extraordinary decision by the FDA to consider all genetically engineered food, prior to being
studied, to be GRAS weakens consumer safety requirements, because manufacturers no longer
have to establish the safety of these products before selling them.”); Rowe, supra note 192, at
879–80; Erin Quinn & Chris Young, Why the FDA Has Never Looked at Some of the Additives in
Our Food, NPR: SALT (Apr. 14, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/
2015/04/14/399591292/why-the-fda-is-clueless-about-some-of-the-additives-in-our-food
[https://perma.cc/V23M-VD8S] (“Companies have added thousands of ingredients to foods with
little to no government oversight. That’s thanks to a loophole in a decades-old law that allows
them to deem an additive to be ‘generally recognized as safe’—or GRAS—without the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration’s blessing, or even its knowledge. The loophole was originally intended
to allow manufacturers of common ingredients like vinegar and table salt—when added to
processed foods—to bypass the FDA’s lengthy safety-review process. But over time, companies
have found that it’s far more efficient to take advantage of the exemption to get their products on
shelves quickly. Some of these products contain additives that the FDA has found to pose
dangers.”).
201.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14–17 (“[T]he companies only engage in a
voluntary and informal ‘consultation process’ with the FDA. As a result, the GMOs that are on
grocery store shelves today have never been tested for human health hazards. . . . A peerreviewed paper published in 2004 examined nearly one hundred sources, including regulatory
documents and unpublished studies by industry, and concluded that approval in the United
States is ‘a rubber-stamp process’ designed to ‘increase public confidence in, but not ensure the
safety of, genetically engineered foods.’”); see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 15; Rowe, supra
note 192, at 879–80 (“[N]either premarket testing nor FDA approval is required before
genetically modified plant foods are sold to consumers.”).
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labels are not required202 because GMO foods are not considered by
the FDA to be “substantially different from their conventional
counterparts.”203
No one, including insurers,204 wants to take responsibility for
the safety of GMOs. The FDA claims that “it is the food producer who
is responsible for assuring safety.”205 Meanwhile, Monsanto states
that it “should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food. Our
interest is in selling as much of it as possible. Assuring its safety is
the FDA’s job.”206
The agrochemical and agrobiotech industries are a political
force, ever-increasing in power.207 Monsanto and other agrochemical
or agrobiotech companies, like Dow, DuPont, and Syngenta, all have
“a long history in the chemical business and a lot of experience
avoiding government regulation.”208 Based on successful lobbying
efforts, the industry was able to effectively exempt itself from the
“most important environmental and consumer protection laws.”209 Yet
202.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16 (“Even though public-opinion polls repeatedly
show that well over 90 percent of Americans want labels on genetically engineered foods, those
labels are not allowed.”).
203.
Rowe, supra note 192, at 879–80; see also CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 15 (“Early
on, [agencies] made a preemptive decision to approve all GMOs on the basis of a concept known
as ‘substantial equivalence.’ The biotechnology industry created a blanket exemption for its
products by simply declaring, without any scientific basis, that those products were the same as
their natural counterparts.”); WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 16 (“Having found GM food to be
‘substantially equivalent’ to conventionally grown food, the FDA argues that there is no need for
it to carry out an assessment of every GM food product.”).
204.
See WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 51 (“It is a powerful indication that we are not in
the domain of traditional risk management when insurers refuse to cover the potential damages
from transgenic crops, claiming that too little is known about their effects for them to calculate
coverage.”).
205.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16.
206.
Id.
207.
See id. at 20 (“Responsibility for the lack of meaningful regulation lies with the
agrochemical companies, with the regulators, and with those scientists who from the beginning
wanted to avoid public scrutiny. . . . Their decision to regulate themselves facilitated the
industry’s success with politicians, who were then easily persuaded to go along with selfregulation.”); WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 96 (“The industry shapes its own regulatory
environment.”).
208.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 12 (“The dismantling of the U.S. regulatory system was
a key element in the agrochemical industry’s successful strategy to impose GMOs on the
marketplace. Much of the controversy surrounding genetically engineered plants can be
attributed to the fact that they are not effectively regulated and the public has no way of
knowing whether or not they are safe. Agrobiotechnology has been commercialized by companies
like Dow, DuPont, Syngenta, and Monsanto, all of which have a long history in the chemical
business and a lot of experience avoiding government regulation.”); see also WHITESIDE, supra
note 192, at 16 (“The whole process of designing regulatory structures was closed to the public
and largely shaped by the very industry that was to be regulated.”).
209.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 16.
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many trade secret owners have previously shown themselves not to be
concerned with public health, but rather with making money and
avoiding responsibility for any harm they cause.210 Nevertheless,
under current laws and regulations, companies decide what research
information and data to share, often designating the information they
do share as “trade secrets.”211
As a result, companies presently “engage in a voluntary and
informal consultation process with the FDA,”212 such that GMOs in
grocery stores (which include 80 percent of the processed foods sold)
“have never been tested for human health hazards.”213 Because the
FDA’s policy is to neither test nor label GMOs, “the feeding trials are
taking place at our dinner tables.”214
GMOs may pose long-term hazards to human health and the
environment.215 Among other illnesses,216 food-related diseases have
doubled since the introduction of GMOs,217 and food allergies are
rising rapidly.218 Further, there has been “an increased risk of cancer
from elevated levels of the IGF-1 factor in milk from cows treated with
Monsanto’s genetically engineered bovine growth hormone.”219
Additionally, herbicide use has increased dramatically since
herbicide-resistant GMO crops were planted.220 Herbicides are known
to pollute the environment and to “cause health problems for humans
and animals.”221 In light of the increased herbicides and the fact that

210.
See id. at 19 (“Corporations are about making money, not moral decisions.”); see
supra Part IV.
211.
Rowe, supra note 192, at 877.
212.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 14.
213.
Id. at 14, 20.
214.
Id. at 40–41.
215.
Hill, supra note 189, at 177–78.
216.
See Secrecy Still Protects Genetically Modified Foods from Disclosure, CTR. FOR
EFFECTIVE
GOV’T
(Jan.
10,
2012),
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11944
[https://perma.cc/3C9M-VCWY] (“In 2009, the American Academy of Environmental Medicine
highlighted several animal studies that indicated serious health risks associated with GE
[genetically engineered] food, including infertility, immune system problems, accelerated aging,
faulty insulin regulation, and changes in major organs and the digestive system.”).
217.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 39 (“A study in Ireland showed that food-related
diseases doubled during the same time that GMO food was introduced.”).
218.
See id. (“GMOs are novel proteins that have never been in the human diet before,
and allergies are rising everywhere.”); Secrecy Still Protects Genetically Modified Foods from
Disclosure, supra note 216 (“[T]ests show that GE crops can induce allergies.”).
219.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 39–40; see also STEEL, supra note 53, at 205–11.
220.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 30 (“The most widely grown GMO crop is Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready soybean, a soybean engineered to withstand being sprayed with Monsanto’s
best-selling herbicide, Roundup.”).
221.
Id.
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industry is feeding GMO corn to animals,222 it is not surprising that
dozens of animal studies show serious health problems associated
with GMOs.223
When side effects occur in humans, the tort system does not
provide an effective remedy.224 Because consumers generally do not
know whether they have consumed a genetically modified product, “it
becomes very difficult to establish a causal connection between the
product and any resulting injury. Moreover, without the requisite
[information], it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to show that the
risk of harm was foreseeable.”225
Meanwhile, Japan, New Zealand, and the European Union
have banned genetically modified ingredients,226 and “over 60
countries around the world require labeling of GMOs, including
Russia, India, [and] even China.”227 Yet, in the United States,
agrochemical and agrobiotech companies have spent millions to
convince the public that genetically modified foods are good while
refusing to disclose the studies that have actually been conducted.228
VI. CURRENT METHODS ARE INSUFFICIENT
As evidenced by historical examples and current concerns, it is
clear that regulations, laws, whistleblowers, the press, the police, and
the courts are no match for companies hiding dangerous trade secrets.
As things now stand, the public must wait until actual harm appears

222.
See FOOD, INC. 21:12 (Magnolia Pictures, Participant Media & River Road
Entertainment 2008).
223.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 40.
224.
See Rowe, supra note 192, at 881–82.
225.
Id.; see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 17 (“[T]he undeclared mixing of GM and
non-GM products . . . obliterate[s] the possibility of detecting early warning signs of health or
environmental danger. . . . [I]f after a number of years, any of the potential risks to human
health do happen to materialize, it will be extremely difficult to discover the role of the
transgenic product in the risk and then remove the product from distribution.”).
226.
HILLSTROM, supra note 190, at 23; see also Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the
Precautionary Principle into the UK, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra
note 189, at 229, 241 (“The control of genetically modified organisms is one area going beyond
traditional pollution control where, as a result of EC legislation, the precautionary principle is
embodied in UK legislation.”).
227.
GMO OMG (Compeller Pictures, Heartworn Pictures & Nature’s Path 2013).
228.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 62 (“There are reports of rigged crop trials and
inadequate and unreliable industry statements to regulators, and many anecdotes about how the
biotechnology industry has tried to smear its critics. . . . Chuck Benbrook[,] . . . one of the few
independent economists who, using publicly available data, has shown that agricultural genetic
engineering is not living up to its promises . . . said . . . ‘The level of intellectual dishonesty in the
discourse on GM crops . . . [is] an indicator that we are losing the ability of critically evaluating
the choices that we need to make, as a society.’”).
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before anything can be done about it.229 And even after the public
discovers the harm, it often takes many years to partially remediate
the situation.230 Full remediation will likely never occur.231
Through lobbying efforts, the industries are essentially
regulating themselves,232 and such self-regulation is not working.
Corporations focus on the bottom line, often at the expense of public
health and safety.233 Many corporations are governed by a powerful
elite that stresses silence and loyalty. They and their obedient
members are impervious to outside criticism.234 They take risks for
one another and the organization, collectively agreeing to questionable
actions that no one individual would take on his or her own.235 And
given the various legal protections available, officers and directors
face little personal risk.236
Regulations and laws include exceptions for trade secrets,237
such that “the name of the chemical, its manufacturer, intended uses,
and production quantities are withheld as confidential business
information” (CBI).238 One seemingly well-intentioned reform bill to
229.
See Kelly, supra note 59 (“With no mandatory safety testing for the vast majority of
the tens of thousands of chemicals used daily in America, doctors and public health officials have
little information to guide them as they seek to identify potential health hazards[.]”).
230.
See STEEL, supra note 53, at 73 (“[T]he harm to human health or the environment
persists for decades or more even after the activity generating the harm ceases.”).
231.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 272–73 (“There may be no victims ready to come forward
or visibly injured because no one in effect feels victimized . . . . In toxic-waste disposal or
embezzlement, . . . there are persons who would feel victimized if they knew about the crime, but
who file no complaint since they are unaware of it.”).
232.
See sources cited supra note 207.
233.
See Rich, supra note 56 (reporting that rather than developing an alternative that
would be “less toxic and stay[] in the body for a much shorter duration,” DuPont decided to
continue using PFOA because “[t]he risk was too great: Products manufactured with PFOA were
an important part of DuPont’s business, worth $1 billion in annual profit.”); Trade Secrets: A
Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 53:47–54:00 (“Instead of changing its behavior, the
petrochemical industry turned to the courts to stop the regulation. The companies argued that
reducing exposure to benzene would be too costly.”).
234.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 25, 123, 147, 173.
235.
See id.
236.
See 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 2.01 (8th ed. 2017). For example, the business judgment rule presumes that
officers and directors act in the best interests of the corporation; it protects them from liability
for acts of negligence. Id. Likewise, directors and officers can obtain liability insurance that will
indemnify them for defense costs. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra, § 23.03.
237.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012); see also MILGRIM, supra note 4 at § 12.03.
238.
Sharon Lerner, A Chemical Shell Game: How DuPont Concealed the Dangers of the
New Teflon Toxin, INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/03/03/howdupont-concealed-the-dangers-of-the-new-teflon-toxin/ [https://perma.cc/5LSR-RSUZ] (“When
companies want to begin making and selling a new chemical, they are required to file a written
notice with the EPA. But current regulations do not mandate that any particular health or safety
studies be performed, and according to a 2007 report from the EPA, only 15 percent of new
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the Toxic Substances Control Act would have actually caused more
damage if it had passed, as it would have “allow[ed] companies to
claim chemical identity in health studies as CBI.”239
Some laws, such as the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
(DTSA),240 include provisions that aim to protect whistleblowers;241
however, whistleblowers have historically not received adequate
protection.242 “If those in charge knowingly manufacture unsafe
products or engage in corporate bribery, then the open-door policy is
but a trap for the outspoken; even when employees suffer no reprisal
for having voiced a criticism to management, they will usually find
that it has simply been ignored.”243 There are too many ways for
chemical notices contain any information about the materials’ impact on health. Moreover,
chemical manufacturers are permitted to claim that various parts of the information they give
the EPA are ‘confidential business information,’ or CBI. About 95 percent of new chemical
notifications, according to a 2005 Government Accountability Office report, include information
that is protected as a trade secret, a figure the EPA confirmed as still ‘generally accurate.’ . . .
Manufacturers have used the CBI shield to withhold the names and identities of 17,585 of the
chemicals now registered with the EPA.”).
239.
Id. (“Chemical manufacturers are required by Section 8 (e) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act to report any information to the EPA that ‘reasonably supports the conclusion that’ a
substance they make or use ‘presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment.’
But the critical information in these 8 (e) reports can also be claimed as confidential.”).
240.
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No 114-153, § 7, 130 Stat. 376, 384–85
(2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2016)) (providing “[i]mmunity from liability for
confidential disclosure of a trade secret to the Government or in a court filing . . . for the purpose
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law”).
241.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 211 (“‘Whistleblower’ is a recent label for those who . . .
make revelations meant to call attention to negligence, abuses, or dangers that threaten the
public interest.”).
242.
See, e.g., Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 83 F.3d 1575, 1581–82 (9th Cir. 1996)
(denying plaintiff-whistleblower’s claim for retaliatory discharge because she did not report the
violations to the proper authority); Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y. Univ., No. 96 CIV.
5997(JFK), 1998 WL 474084, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998) (dismissing plaintiffswhistleblowers’ claims because they did not engage in protected activity of which defendants
were aware); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981) (conceding that
plaintiff-whistleblower had exposed serious misconduct, the court denied him protection for
failure to recite with sufficient specificity how the defendant-employer had violated specific
statutes); Luethans v. Wash. Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 172–73 (Mo. 1995) (granting summary
judgment to defendant because plaintiff-whistleblower was a contract employee, rather than an
at-will employee), abrogated by Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. 2010); Kern
v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 252, 252–53 (App. Div. 1989) (dismissing
plaintiff-whistleblower’s claim because defendant’s actions “did not create and present a
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety”); Maus v. Nat’l Living Ctrs., Inc.,
633 S.W.2d 674, 675, 677 (Tex. App. 1982) (affirming judgment refusing to award damages to
appellant-whistleblower because she was an at-will employee); see also Martin H. Malin,
Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 277
(1983).
243.
BOK, supra note 1, at 226; see also Malin, supra note 242, at 286 (“The
whistleblower must expect employer retaliation and weigh the consequences in deciding whether
to act . . . .”).
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employers to penalize whistleblowers without detection.244
Furthermore, the whistleblower bears the burden of proof.245
Likewise, the First Amendment’s freedom of the press246 cannot
protect the public from dangerous trade secrets. After all, the media
cannot shed light on what it cannot see.247 Moreover, when the media
becomes aware of certain information, it often serves commercial
interests.248
Additionally, the US criminal justice system does not treat
criminals from different social backgrounds equally.249 As such, laws
relating to white-collar crime (e.g., toxic waste violations) do not have
enough teeth to counter the use of trade secrets that damage the
public health.250 Further, such abuses are hard to detect if no one
brings a complaint.251 Ordinary police methods therefore “do not serve
well against such crimes.”252
Civil litigation is also not an effective solution, as victims are
often unaware of the cause of their injuries253 and, even if they
244.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 212, 227. While demotion, dismissal, salary reduction, and
job reassignment are noticeable adverse actions, retaliation can also be more subtle (e.g., denial
of promotion, negative evaluation, increased surveillance, ostracizing the employee, hostile
remarks). See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2000).
245.
See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240; 1
EDWARD T. ELLIS & GREGORY C. KEATING, WHISTLEBLOWING AND RETALIATION § 2.1 (2016).
246.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . .
the press.”).
247.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012). The Freedom of Information Act includes nine
exemptions, including but not limited to “trade secrets,” “privileged or confidential” information,
or “commercial or financial information.” Id.
248.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 264 (“The press and other news media rightly stand for
openness in public discourse. . . . Yet the media serve commercial and partisan interests in
addition to public ones; and media practices of secrecy, selective disclosure, and probing should
not be exempt from scrutiny.”); Esther Gal-Or, Tansev Geylani & Tuba Pinar Yildrim, The
Impact of Advertising on Media Bias, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 92, 96–97, 99 (2012).
249.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 269; Cedric Michel, Violent Street Crime Versus Harmful
White-Collar Crime: A Comparison of Perceived Seriousness and Punitiveness, 24 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 127, 138 (2016).
250.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 269 (“The burden of white-collar crime is immense;
through the corruption of a few, it weighs on all citizens. White-collar or economic crime
encompasses such activities as tax fraud, bribery, labor racketeering, arson-for-profit, insurance
fraud, and toxic-waste violations. It has been estimated to cost the nation ten times as much as
all the street crimes . . . put together . . . .”).
251.
See id. at 273.
252.
See id.
253.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 272–73 (“In toxic-waste disposal or embezzlement, on the
other hand, there are persons who would feel victimized if they knew about the crime, but who
file no complaint since they are unaware of it.”); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54,
at 46:38–46:58 (“No public warning was issued. Now, 30 years later, those hairdressers and their
customers are unaware of the risks to which they were exposed. And it is impossible to know how
many women may have been sick or died—without knowing why.”).
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surmise such liability, they do not have the proof needed.254 For
diseases related to chemical exposure, moreover, the long-term onset
of the illness may present additional hurdles to recovery, such as
statutes of limitations and intervening bankruptcies.255 In the rare
situation when someone actually gets close to proving his or her
claims, the company offers a settlement under a strict nondisclosure
agreement.256
When cases actually go to trial, the court system has generally
not been effective. In fact, some courts have held that the general
public interest in revealing trade secrets was minimal because the
transfer of the secret between private commercial parties did not
prejudice the public.257 However, when the exchange is no longer

254.
See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CS218078-A, CHEMICALS, CANCER, AND YOU 3, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/emes/
public/docs/Chemicals,%20Cancer,%20and%20You%20FS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HTV-S4DZ]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (“Getting cancer from a chemical depends on . . . [t]he kind of chemical
you were exposed to, [h]ow much of the chemical you were in contact with, [h]ow long the contact
lasted, [h]ow often you were exposed, [w]hen you were exposed, [h]ow you were exposed, and
[y]our general health.”); Rowe, supra note 192, at 881–82 (“With genetically modified foods,
however, the tort system is not a feasible option. Since consumers are generally unaware that
they have even consumed a genetically modified food, it becomes very difficult to establish a
causal connection between the product and any resulting injury. Moreover, without the requisite
research to evaluate genetically modified foods, it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to show that
the risk of harm was foreseeable, or conversely, independent research could also reveal that the
products pose very little risk.”); Laura Lorenzetti, The Roundup Problem: Why It’s So Hard to
Pinpoint What Causes Cancer, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/15/roundupmonsanto-cancer-link-hard-to-prove/ [https://perma.cc/RK7W-WQ3R].
255.
See Thomas J. Martin, Long-Term Liability for Hazardous Waste Induced Injury in
Missouri: Latent Harm Sufferers Beware, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 299, 304–05, 305
n.26, 313 (1985).
256.
See Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients,
Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, GP SOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 25, 25,
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfi
dentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice.html
[https://perma.cc/ARA4-PFKG] (“Confidentiality prevents the public from knowing about
systemic wrongful conduct. It can also prevent regulators and government agencies from
performing their duty to enforce the law and protect the public. The purpose of the court is to
evenly administer justice to all so that all are protected by the law. When violations are hidden
by confidentiality, the legal system itself is thwarted from fulfilling one of its fundamental
purposes: to protect the citizenry from wrongful conduct.”).
257.
See Levine, supra note 49, at 148–49; see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d
24, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[F]or a state to be able to completely destroy valuable trade secrets, it
should be required to show more than a possible beneficial effect.”); In re Denture Cream Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 09-2051-MD, 2013 WL 214672, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2013) (deciding that the
corporation’s interests in protecting the information outweighed the public’s interest, stressing
that the lack of any FDA request for the information undermined the plaintiff’s argument that
disclosure was necessary because of great public health and safety concerns, and reasoning that
if the FDA did not need the information, then it must not be important); Van Etten v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1384 n.4 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (finding, in a case
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between private commercial parties, but involves the public, the public
interest becomes strong.258 Unfortunately, courts have failed to keep
up with this shift. The result is that, under the traditional view of
trade secrecy law, no one can examine the relevant information
because it must be strictly hidden from the public.259
Suffice it to say, change is needed. However, “it is important to
recognize and balance the interests of all the stakeholders
involved.”260 While investment in research and development should be
protected, the public’s interest should also be safeguarded.261 The
question then becomes, What should be changed? Part VII discusses
some previously offered, yet ineffective, solutions; thereafter, Part VIII
offers a recommendation.
VII. OTHERS’ SUGGESTIONS
The dilemma of companies concealing dangerous ingredients as
trade secrets—choosing profits over public health and environmental
welfare—is not a new one. Many legislators, scholars, and journalists
have grappled with the issue. And while no perfect solution has been
offered, their actions and proposals should be considered and, where
helpful to solving the dilemma, built upon.
Certainly, more could be done to protect human health and the
environment, such as requiring those with legislative or regulatory
influence “to reveal their ties to the relevant industries,” widen the
involving negligent design or manufacture of car tires, that “concerns of public health and safety
trump any right to shield [trade secret] material from public scrutiny”), vacated sub nom. Chi.
Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no trade
secret and explaining the “good cause” test, wherein the party seeking document protection must
show that its interests in keeping the information secret outweigh the opposing party’s interest
in obtaining the information); Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that California’s Air Toxics “Hot Spots”
Information and Assessment Act of 1987 favored granting trade secret status over disclosure to
the public, thus the exemptions granted “[were] absolute, and [did] not depend upon a further
balancing of harm to the public”).
258.
See Levine, supra note 49, at 148–49; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1007 (1984) (holding that loss of trade secrets is not a taking when one receives an economic
advantage for it); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1919) (“The right of a
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be held subject to the
right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require
that the nature of the product be fairly set forth.”).
259.
See Levine, supra note 49, at 151 (“[U]nder trade secrecy law there is no opportunity
for the general public to easily examine information deemed secret.”); id. at 190 (“[C]ourts have
had a difficult time determining what a ‘public concern’ is for purposes of First Amendment
protection of disclosure.”).
260.
Rowe, supra note 192, at 891–92 (addressing patent protection, as opposed to trade
secrets).
261.
See id.
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regulatory process “to include a range of specialists,” “seek[] greater
citizen participation in the regulatory process,” and “mandate[] the
labeling and traceability of the novel products.”262
In terms of legislation, California often leads the way when it
comes to protecting consumers and the environment.263 For example,
in October 2013, California enacted the Safer Consumer Product
(SCP) regulations.264 The regulations identify approximately 1,200
chemicals as “chemicals of concern,” such that manufacturers are
required to disclose products containing these chemicals.265 However,
as with other laws, these regulations carve out some exceptions for
trade secrets.266 Less than five months after the regulations’ effective
date, “trade secret” was already listed as an ingredient in 1,445
products.267
Thus, while legislators have admirable goals in
mind—namely, protecting their citizens from toxic chemicals268—the
trade secret carve-outs in those laws (as with the laws discussed in
Parts IV and V above) curtail the state and federal governments’
abilities to meet such goals.

262.
WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 22–24, 120 (“Precautionary measures may include
things like additional research, labeling requirements, and creating new regulatory agencies.”).
263.
See Daniel Corbett & Mark Mermelstein, Green Chemistry and Trade Secrets:
California Leads Chemical Disclosure Movement, As Companies Wrestle with Options for
Protection, ORRICK: TRADE SECRETS WATCH (Feb. 14, 2014), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secretswatch/2014/02/14/green-chemistry-and-trade-secrets-california-leads-chemical-disclosuremovement-as-companies-wrestle-with-options-for-protection/
[https://perma.cc/RU3V-6D5P];
Ronald White, New California Regulations Lead the Way in Protecting Consumers from Toxic
Chemicals, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T: CITIZEN HEALTH & SAFETY (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/new-california-regulations-lead-way-protecting-consumers-toxicchemicals [https://perma.cc/Q98D-6PGP]; see also Chris Conley, California Leads on Electronic
Privacy. Other States Must Follow., ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Oct. 13, 2015, 5:15 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/california-leads-electronic-privacyother-states-must [https://perma.cc/45B2-NXMW] (regarding electronic privacy); Abby
Goodnough, California Tries to Guide the Way on Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/health/policy/california-tries-to-lead-way-on-health-law.html
[https://perma.cc/28E2-MC62] (regarding healthcare); Katrina vanden Heuvel, Opinion, Once
Again,
California
Leads
the
Way,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/once-again-california-leads-the-way/2015/12/08/
3bdc8cf4-9d0a-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html?utm_term=.1335484a7ae0
[https://perma.cc/2TNA-C3QY] (regarding climate change).
264.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 69501(a) (2018).
265.
See Corbett & Mermelstein, supra note 263; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 69502.2(a); Candidate Chemicals List, CAL. DEP’T TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL,
http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SCP/CandidateChemicals.cfm [https://perma.cc/XQM8-PT4R] (last visited
Mar. 5, 2018).
266.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 69509, 69505.7(a)(4).
267.
Corbett & Mermelstein, supra note 263.
268.
See id. (“At least 33 states are considering new regulations of toxic chemicals in
products.”).
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Some scholars have proposed eliminating trade secret
protection altogether and instead requiring technical information to be
solely protected by patents.269 In this regard, it could be argued that
technical protection should be preempted by the current patent law,
the America Invents Act of 2011.270 In 1974, the last time the US
Supreme Court examined this issue, it was reviewing the Patent Act
of 1952 against Ohio’s common law–based trade secret law that, at the
time, required use—as opposed to the UTSA (adopted in Ohio in 1994)
or the DTSA, neither of which require use.271 Therefore, if a case
becomes available for a plaintiff to make this argument, then it would
be interesting to see whether and how the Supreme Court would rule
on the preemption issue based on the new laws. Unfortunately,
neither the public nor the environment can wait for that possibility.
Wendy Wagner argues that “[t]he most sweeping way to
address this problem would be for Congress to make it illegal to
invoke trade secret and other protections to classify information about
the adverse effects of products and activities that threaten public
health and the environment.”272 She states that “[a] requirement
mandating the reporting of all health-related information (including
the chemical compositions of products and wastes) could be enforced
with both civil and criminal sanctions and levied against any party
involved in producing or concealing information.”273
Focusing on the use of trade secrets in the public
infrastructure,274 David Levine proposes several partial solutions that
269.
E.g., Levine, supra note 49, at 170 (“[T]he better option is to severely limit, or
eliminate entirely, the application of the doctrine [when dealing with public infrastructure].”); id.
at 177 (“[A]bandonment of secrecy as a business strategy may also benefit the businesses
themselves . . . .”); id. at 187–88 (“The basic solution is to abandon trade secrecy altogether and
simply require commercial public infrastructure providers to find their protection in patent.”).
270.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
271.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (discussing Ohio trade
secret law, which originated from the Restatement of Torts, in light of the 1952 Patent Act and
finding that “Ohio’s law of trade secrets is not preempted by the patent laws of the United
States”); see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), (4) (2012); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), § 1 cmt. (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (“The definition of ‘trade secret’ contains a reasonable departure
from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade secret be
‘continuously used in one’s business.’ The broader definition in the proposed Act extends
protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade
secret to use.”); ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 30, at 41 (“Among the main differences between
the earlier Restatement of Torts definition of a trade secret and the more modern [Uniform Trade
Secrets Act] and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition definitions are that the latter do not
require that the secret be ‘in use’ by the owner in order to qualify for protection.”).
272.
Wagner, supra note 48, at 1726–27.
273.
Id. at 1727.
274.
See generally Levine, supra note 49.
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would increase transparency: (1) narrowing the definition to that
which “is actually used in commerce or where its disclosure would
pose an immediate threat to the security of the infrastructure itself”;
(2) limiting the duration of trade secrecy; and (3) changing the
remedies allowed by limiting relief to monetary damages and “denying
injunctive relief for the misappropriation or innocent release of public
infrastructure trade secrets.”275
The suggestion to amend the
definition of trade secret law276 is well taken; however, the limitation
to infrastructure alone will not solve the dilemma posed herein.
Elizabeth Rowe takes a similar tack regarding food-related
patents.277 She “concludes that, on balance, the public interest in
promoting independent research on the health and safety effects of
foods should outweigh the patent holder’s interest in controlling the
state of adverse information available about its product.”278 Her
article recommends “that courts use a ‘patent overreach’ doctrine to
rein in” patent law’s limitation of access and restriction of research
where public health and safety may be threatened.279 She also calls
for a greater discussion “about reconciling patenting with public
policy, and patenting with science and research” because Congress
and the courts should evaluate patent law’s role “in limiting, rather
than promoting, the progress of science, especially when public health
and safety is implicated.”280 Although patent protection is rooted in
the Progress Clause281 and federal trade secret protection is rooted in
the Commerce Clause,282 Rowe’s logic could and should be applied to

275.
Id. at 191–92.
276.
Id. (“[T]he commercial definition of a trade secret could be narrowed . . . to only
apply to information that is actually used in commerce or where its disclosure would pose an
immediate threat to the security of the infrastructure itself.”).
277.
See Rowe, supra note 192, at 892–93.
278.
Id. at 892.
279.
Id. at 862, 892. “[T]he primary concern of the patent system is the public
interest.” Id. at 882–83 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320
(1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchem. Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31
(1945)). Therefore, “[w]here patent overreaching violates our sensibilities about justice and
fairness and potentially threatens public health and safety, courts . . . should take notice in order
to protect the public interest.” Id. at 889.
280.
Id. at 893.
281.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
282.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”).
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trade secret law, as one of the policy goals underlying trade secret
protection is the encouragement of innovation.283
Those impacted by dangerous trade secrets should have access
to such information. In this regard, Sissela Bok argues that if the
secret involves a practice that is harmful to the public, then it should
be revealed regardless of the loss of benefits to the trade secret
owner.284 Similarly, Levine, along with nine other law professors, sent
a letter (citing Rowe’s article) to the Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation
Commission in October 2013, stating that
it is a basic principle in a democracy that the public shall conduct informed debate
and discussion of public matters. To do this, there must be broad access to data
about potential environmental, health and safety (EHS) hazards, even when the
disclosure of such information might pose some pecuniary risk to the firms that are
introducing the possibility of [such] risks.285

Finally, Philip Landrigan, Chairman of the Department of
Preventative Medicine at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, would have
chemicals presumed “guilty until they are proven innocent.”286 He
asserts that this could be accomplished by creating “an unpolluted
political structure that is empowered to set regulations that protect
the public health.”287 While it would be ideal to dismantle the current
lobbying scheme, which enables various industries to protect their
bottom line and, therefore, keep dangerous secrets hidden, that is not
likely to occur anytime soon. Concrete steps need to be taken now,
and the best way to do that is through trade secret law itself.
VIII. AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL: INCORPORATE THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE INTO TRADE SECRET LAW
There are many benefits to trade secret protection, and it
should not be eliminated. Inventors and businesses need to protect
their investment in research and development. Thus, trade secrets

283.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); BOK, supra note 1, at
147, 148.
284.
BOK, supra note 1, at 148 (“[T]he secrecy may concern practices so harmful or
invasive that they ought to be revealed, no matter how much secrecy would increase business
incentives.”); id. at 162 (“[A]s soon as a study places human subjects, laboratory workers, or
bystanders at risk, the investigators can no longer claim it as their intellectual property to be
revealed or kept secret as they choose.”).
285.
E-mail from David S. Levine, Professor, Elon Univ. Sch. of Law et al., to Cathy P.
Foerster, Comm’r, Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, at 2–3, 9 (Oct. 14, 2013) [hereinafter
Letter
to
Alaska
Oil],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363099
[https://perma.cc/CMH6-CQEJ].
286.
Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 59:39–1:00:02.
287.
Id.
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should continue to receive protection for legitimate activities.288 After
all, not everyone is abusing the system.
However, when trade secrets endanger others, broader public
interests are at issue. Public health should take priority over
commercial interests.289 If ongoing concealment is harmful, then it
may become necessary to reveal the trade secret or at least a portion
thereof.290 Persons who might be adversely affected by a trade secret
should be provided with “specific data that describes any discharges
into the environment—including chemical identity, volume and
locations of each chemical discharged—and data on health and
ecological effects.”291 The scientific community is in agreement,
having called for greater transparency for quite some time.292
Under current law, the trade secret owner’s practices and
products are presumed safe. However, as explained above, that is
often not true. In light of the historical examples of trade secret
abuse, the existing concerns, and the ineffectiveness of current
methods to combat such abuse, the law should be revised so that the
burden of proof with regard to public health is on the trade secret
owner. Creating or revising one environmental law or regulation will
not fix this—trade secrets impact too many industries. Rather, trade
secret law must itself be changed.

288.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 134 (“[T]hese institutions should be able to invoke
confidentiality for legitimate activities such as internal memoranda and personnel files; but it is
a different matter altogether to claim confidentiality for plans that endanger others.”).
289.
See id.; Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 7 (“[T]rade secrecy should not impede
disclosure of information when the information describes public risks that the trade secret
claimant is itself creating.”).
290.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 162 (“[A]s soon as a study places human subjects,
laboratory workers, or bystanders at risk, the investigators [or owners of the information should]
no longer [be able to] claim it as their intellectual property to be revealed or kept secret as they
choose.”); Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 7.
291.
Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 3; see also BOK, supra note 1, at 148; Trade
Secrets: A Moyers Report, supra note 54, at 42:05–42:10 (showing a portion of an interview with
Everett Hoffpauir, a former worker at Conoco, who stated, “we can’t live in a risk-free society.
But we can live in an honest society.”).
292.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 153 (“[M]odern scientists . . . have held free and open
communication to be the most essential requirement for their work.”); id. at 170 (“Many
scientists and scientific organizations have called for inquiries into the questions of responsibility
and choice raised by the growing conflicts over secrecy.”); O’REILLY, supra note 168, § 10:13, at
115–16 (“The American Public Health Assn. has called for policies that anticipate potential
public health threats, require greater transparency, and provide for monitoring as part of an
overall precautionary approach towards natural gas operations.” (citing The Environmental and
Occupational Health Impacts of High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing of Unconventional Gas
Reserves, APHA (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policystatements/policy-database/2014/10/02/15/37/hydraulic-fracturing
[https://perma.cc/CZ6QH3HC])).
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The enaction of the DTSA in 2016 created a federal private
right of action for trade secret misappropriation.293 The DTSA offers
an opportunity to change trade secret law across the nation in a
manner that would better balance commercial interests and public
health.
This goal can be accomplished by incorporating the
precautionary principle, which has been regularly applied
internationally,294 into the DTSA’s definition of a trade secret at 18
U.S.C. § 1839(3).
The precautionary principle, often called the “better safe than
sorry” principle,295 “holds that governments have an affirmative duty
to take preventative measures to avoid harm.”296 The result is that
public health and welfare will be better protected from corporations
that place profit above ethics. If, however, the corporation claiming
trade secret protection provides sufficient evidence that its product or
process will not cause harm, then it will be eligible for trade secret
protection. Essentially, incorporation of the precautionary principle
into the DTSA would mean that corporations must prove that their
products and processes are safe in order to receive trade secret
protection. This determination can and should involve third-party
analysis, so as to avoid corrupted science.297
The precautionary principle “shifts the burden of proof to the
proponents of an activity or developers of a product, to show that it
293.
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012).
294.
See CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 19 (“The precautionary principle is now embedded
in an array of international environmental treaties, including the International Biosafety
Protocol, adopted in Montreal, Canada, in 2002.”); WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 19 (“Germany
is usually acknowledged as the birthplace of the European version of the precautionary
principle.”); id. at 20 (“Under Article 16, any EU member state may ‘provisionally restrict or
prohibit’ the use or sale of a product if it has justifiable reason to suspect that an approved
product poses a ‘risk to human health or the environment.’” (quoting David Vogel, Ships Passing
in the Night: The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States 9 (Eur.
Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2001/16, 2001))); id. at 146 (“By the year 2000, the precautionary
principle had made its way into some sixteen international treaties and documents.”); Haigh,
supra note 226, at 233 (“From the date of its entry into force (1 November 1993), the Treaty of
Maastricht requires Community policy on the environment to be based on the precautionary
principle.”); Hill, supra note 189, at 174 (“The UK Government’s 1993 Strategy for Sustainable
Development states that ‘The UK adopted a precautionary approach to modern biotechnology
because the lack of experience meant that it was not possible to predict the risks to humans and
the environment.’”); Cordner, supra note 154 (“In the European Union, safety laws guarantee
that both industrial and household chemicals are vetted for their potential risks to human health
and the environment before they appear on the market.”); Hawthorn, supra note 161 (“Unlike
Europe, where companies generally are required to prove the safety of their chemicals before use,
U.S. law requires manufacturers to submit safety data only if they have it.”).
295.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 18–19.
296.
Id. at 18.
297.
See supra Parts III, IV, and V.
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will not cause harm or at least to monitor and evaluate its
performance over time.”298 It is preferable to shift this burden to those
who want to gain trade secret protection, rather than expecting
victims to subsequently seek compensation.299
We need to draw lessons from past injuries.300 As illustrated in
Part IV above, “damages from new risks can take many years to
become evident[,] and then their effects can last for generations.”301
The precautionary principle, moreover, “is precisely for cases of
serious potential danger where risks are poorly understood.”302 This is
even more critical when dealing with corporations that have
knowingly exposed the public to dangers in the past.303
Adding the precautionary principle to the DTSA should at least
curb corporations’ use of trade secrets as a shield to conceal dangers
from the public. Moreover, this change to the law is likely to result in
earlier detection of dangers to public health and the environment
because, under the shifted burden, “uncertainty becomes the ground
for additional caution, not for business as usual.”304 Companies’
“experiments” on the public and the environment “must be exposed to
wider debate.”305 We have a “moral responsibility to protect future
generations.”306

298.
CUMMINGS, supra note 42, at 19.
299.
See Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contemporary
Significance of the Precautionary Principle, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
supra note 189, at 12, 16.
300.
See WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 38, 146 (“The emergence of the precautionary
principle is a classic example of social learning in environmental affairs. Social learning refers to
the process by which whole communities, not just individuals, draw lessons from their
experiences of success and failure in dealing with challenges, gradually developing their level of
moral insight and practical skill.”).
301.
Id. at 32, 46 (“The purpose of the precautionary principle is to help us address
threats that are not immediate—ones in which the onset of harms may be delayed for decades.”);
id. at 89 (“The precautionary principle . . . . aims at long-term, often invisible dangers . . . .”); see
supra Part IV.
302.
WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 49.
303.
See O’Riordan & Cameron, supra note 299, at 18 (“[T]here ought to be a penalty for
not being cautious or caring in the past. This suggests that those who have created a large
ecological burden already should be more ‘precautious’ than those whose ecological footprints
have to date been lighter.”); see also WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 116 (“Precaution . . . .
mandates renewed efforts to expose commercial interests that disguise themselves as impartial
science.”).
304.
WHITESIDE, supra note 192, at 34, 102 (“The precautionary principle incites us to
debate about what risks we really want to take and under what conditions.”).
305.
Id. at 102.
306.
Id. at 111.
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Precaution is not prohibition.307 The incorporation of the
precautionary principle into trade secret law would not prevent
corporations from making certain products or using certain processes.
It would, however, require them to disclose trade secrets to the
public—if and only if the corporation could not demonstrate that the
product or process does not endanger the public or the environment.
Inclusion of the precautionary principle need not be a barrier to
development.308 On the contrary, precaution should result in better
science and, therefore, improved performance.309 The precautionary
principle is not designed to ask what the worst outcome might be.310
Rather, it is concerned with existing evidence that there is a “real
potential for danger.”311 If such danger exists, then the precautionary
principle demands that experimentation or gradual implementation
take place in order to confirm or deny the danger “before it becomes
widespread or irreversible.”312
To incorporate the precautionary principle into the DTSA, the
definition of trade secret could be narrowed.313 For example, § 1839(3)
could be revised by including an additional element, as illustrated
below:
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if—
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or
use of the information; and

307.
See id. at 52.
308.
See id. at 109.
309.
See id. at 57–58 (“[P]recaution can reasonably be perceived as more scientific than
the traditional approach, where alternatives are ignored and there is misplaced confidence in the
existing state of knowledge. Precaution favors an ‘extended science,’ with additional
transparency in argumentation, acknowledged uncertainties, and an openness to the ongoing
revision of knowledge. It is also about better science—science that is transdisciplinary and
holistic, attentive to ecological complexity; science whose research program retains greater
independence from social and economic pressures.”).
310.
See id. at 113.
311.
See id.
312.
Id.
313.
See Levine, supra note 49, at 191–92.
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(C) the information does not endanger public health.314

The rationale behind such a change is that ongoing protection of such
secrets is contradictory to the underlying policies of trade secret
protection: to incentivize innovation, maintain business ethics, and
share information with employees and business partners.315
Preventing the disclosure of environmental, health, and safety
information necessary for informed debate of fundamental public
concerns is not what was envisioned when trade secret law
originated.316 Such protection “was not designed to address questions
about access to information for reasons other than commercial
competition.”317
Of course, the biggest drawback to this plan is that the DTSA
is a federal law that does not preempt state trade secret laws.318
Thus, companies could still claim trade secrecy under state law.
However, in the future, Congress could amend the DTSA regarding
preemption, or the Supreme Court might rule that patent law
preempts trade secret law in certain cases. As discussed in Part VII,
the last time the Court examined this issue was in the 1974 Kewanee
Oil decision,319 a pre-UTSA case in which Ohio had adopted the
Restatement of Torts’ definition of a trade secret (which required use)
and long before Congress revised the Patent Act.320 Alternatively,
states can begin amending their laws in the same manner suggested
for the DTSA.
IX. CONCLUSION
Trade secrecy is an important mechanism for protecting
investment and maintaining commercial ethics; however, it has also
been abused over the years at the cost of public health and safety.
Despite numerous attempts, no adequate solution has been
implemented. However, if trade secret law were to incorporate the
precautionary principle, then that would properly maintain the
balance between the owner’s assets and the public health.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2018) (alterations added).
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–82, 486 (1974).
See Letter to Alaska Oil, supra note 285, at 6.
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1838.
See generally Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 474.

